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THE DRAGON AND THE EAGLE - A STUDY OF
U.S.-CHINA RELATIONS IN
CIVIL AIR TRANSPORT
China's civil aviation will expand and modernize in
the next five years to keep pace with the growth in
socialist construction, foreign relations and tourism. A
just-ended civil aviation meeting decided to add more
Chinese international and domestic air routes, speed the
construction of big, modern airfields and train more air
crews to improve the service . . .
Hsinhua News Agency, Peking
February 23, 1978
INTRODUCTION

Inasmuch as business flying is now an economic fact of life in
the modern world, it was relatively unknown sixty-five years ago.
In China, because of persistent conflicts at home and abroad and
the predominance of the traditional economy and means of
transportation, commercial aviation has a history of less than
half a century.
China first witnessed the "flying machine" in 1909 and like
the rest of the world, it was immediately impressed by its vast
economic, political and in particular, military potentials. However, in spite of early Chinese interest in aviation, it was not until
twelve years later that the myth of flying became a reality for the
public. By 1932, the Nationalists had finally laid down the
foundations of an air transport system comprising some 14,000
kilometers of air routes, with a Sino-U.S. and a Sino-German
airline operating a total of thirty planes of varying sizes and
models. Prior to the Communist takeover, China had three
airlines equipped with some one hundred aircraft in active service.
By then, commercial air services had connected the central with
the southwest, southeast and northeast and had managed, on the
international front, to reach Southeast Asia, India, Japan and the
United States on a limited basis. On the other hand, in aircraft
manufacturing, progress and production were very restricted. As
is the case with commercial airlines, foreign investments were
dominant in this area.
The founding of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1949
ushered in new changes and experiences for the industry as a
whole. Under Communism, civil aviation in China went through
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some very strenuous times. Much of this was due to the civil war
which virtually depleted the country's civil air fleet, airfields and
navigational equipment as well as trained personnel. Therefore,
the new government faced a seemingly insurmountable task in
rehabilitating the air transport sector. With less than twenty-eight
aircraft operational and none of the previously organized airlines
left at its disposal, the PRC set off to establish civil aviation step
by step.
Initially, two airlines, one of which was a joint venture with
the Soviet Union, were formed. Attention was directed towards
airfield reconstruction, aircraft repair and maintenance in key
areas. Measures were also taken in the direction of administrative
organization. With continuing efforts, a discernible system of
domestic air services began to take shape. In less than eight
years, route mileage and overall freight and passenger turnover
more than doubled. Moreover, in contrast to the previous decades,
the industry formed an integral part of national economic
planning and became actively involved with geological surveys,
aerial photography and agricultural and forestry production. By
1955, all air services at the mainland had been consolidated into a
single national airline - CAAC, the General Administration of
Civil Aviation of China. For the first time, air transportation in
China became totally state-owned and operated. While this was a
feat in itself, there was unfortunately no similar growth in aircraft
manufacturing. By the same token, although it is evident that
progress in civil aviation in the People's Republic has been sure
and steady through the years, the same, however, was not true of
the economic and socio-political order. In that respect, there were
many ups and downs. The Great Leap, the ensuing economic
retrenchment and recovery, and the Cultural Revolution were but
examples of such vicissitudes. Nevertheless, development in civil
aviation is presently more encouraging.
Mter the Cultural Revolution had climaxed and subsided, and
the Gang of Four came and went, the PRC seems to be now
experiencing truly stabilizing changes at home and abroad.
Today, while an invigorative and ambitious economic and
developmental plan is being actively pursued within the country,
pragmatism is dominating Peking's policy towards the world at
large. To the extent these developments have resulted in a
substantial increase in the PRC's political, economic and cultural
contacts with the West, they have stimulated concomitant and
unprecedented growth in both its domestic and international civil
air transport.
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Indeed, notwithstanding natural calamities and political
upheavals within the country in the past few years, Peking's
official press Hsinhua reported at the end of 1977 that the Chinese
People's Republic now has over 100 domestic air routes linking
more than eighty cities. This represents at least a six-fold increase
from three decades before. Starting with only four international
routes ten years ago, the Chinese airline CAAC has also emerged
from isolation and added another six making a record total of ten
in 1978. Meanwhile, as Canada and the United Kingdom are still
battling for landing rights, flag carriers from nine other nations
offer air services to the Chinese mainland on a regular basis. At
present, besides being signatories to the Chicago and Warsaw
Conventions, Peking is party to over thirty bilateral commercial
aviation agreements. Already a member of the International Civil
Aviation Organization (ICAO), China now contemplates active
participation in the International Air Transport Association
(lATA).
In terms of achievements in civil aviation, the People's
Republic has far surpassed its predecessor. Nevertheless, by
international standards, CAAC's domestic and international
performances still put the PRC behind such Third World countries
as Argentina, the Netherlands, Malaysia, India and Pakistan,
among others. In view of Peking's present commitment to nation·
building, the prospects and problems of sustained progress and
participation in domestic and international aviation (especially in
a manner that corresponds to the needs of its economic and
political developments) will become a matter of serious concern to
the Chinese in the times ahead. Admittedly, air transport to the
PRC will remain secondary to traditional modes of transportation
such as railroad, motor and even water transport in the
foreseeable future, but that would not necessarily undermine its
immense potential value to the new national development
objectives.
To begin with, on the domestic level, as industrial growth
leads to decentralization, a viable air communication system still
offers the best means of integration in the economic and political
sense. If allowed to grow, the system can provide new employment
and industry opportunities. With reference to the latter, assuming
that China continues to import foreign technology and equipment
to expedite its industrialization, it will inevitably begin to
appreciate air freight as a tool for development. By utilizing air
freight, foreign shippers are able to dispatch ultra-high value
cargo promptly, and to speed delivery and effect the timely
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replacement of broken or worn parts. In tum, the Chinese can
minimize costs in inventory control. Similarly, air transport can
improve export earnings since it enables PRC exporters to better
respond to unpredicted product demand, attain greater flexibility
of delivery schedules, and deliver perishables (such as fresh crabs
and fruits) in prime condition.
As a means of offsetting capital outlay for foreign imports,
the PRC government has recently announced its decision to
promote its tourism industry. Without aviation, this cannot be
properly done. Realistically, in order to tap tourist sources, China
must not only improve its present travel services, but it must
develop new and far-reaching routes overseas. If successfully
done, this would have the additional effect of promoting Peking's
political relations with friends and foes among nations abroad.
Moreover, in developing and operating far-flung international
routes, CAAC pilots and navigators can acquire practical
experience which could prove valuable in times of war. Although
not immediately apparent to most people, this aspect is especially
of interest to the Chinese in their present state of concern for
military preparedness against the Soviet Union.
In terms of route-planning, blessed with a travel-conscious
population and as a springboard to Latin America and beyond to
Western Europe, the United States is inevitably a focal point in
CAAC's overseas development plans. But apart from that, a U.S.PRC air link would be desirable in the context of rapprochement.
Equally important, it would facilitate direct and frequent travel of
Chinese officials to the United Nations, and thus would render
more active and meaningful the PRC's participation there.
Furthermore, if a bilateral air agreement is successfully reached,
Peking would regard it as acceptance by the acknowledged leader
of the aviation community. With this in mind, therefore, Part One
of this study examines the problems and possibilities involved in
the development of this aspect of civil aviation relations between
the two countries.
In the final analysis, however, ambitious though it may be,
China's domestic and international aviation expansion scheme
cannot be fully implemented without an adequate and up-to-date
civil air fleet (complete with parts supply) and a competent corp of
management, flight, maintenance and operations personnel.
Although the PRC has acquired some forty-five jetliners in the
last seven years (including, of course, the ten Boeing 707s from the
United States), it will require more planes and trained people for
aviation development commensurate with its economic and
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political advances at home and abroad. Unlike route development,
the build-up process in this instance is both costly and timeconsuming. The problem is that China is not presently selfsufficient for this purpose. Hence it would necessitate import of
foreign aircraft and technology which is ideologically
contradictory to Peking's traditional belief in self-reliance or
"walking on two legs." This poses an interesting but fundamental
question for the present study which Part Two will further
explore.
Assuming that China does tum to the West to acquire such
aviation technology and equipment, the U.S. will no doubt be one
procurement possibility among many. Insofar as American
aircraft manufacturers are concerned, the question is as much one
of "will China do it?," as "how will China do it?." And what are
the opportunities and prospects? Toward that end, Part Two of
this study offers an assessment and some speculations.
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PART ONE

U.S.-CHINA AIR TRANSPORT SERVICES- A CASE
OF CONTROL, CONFLICT AND COMPROMISE
... (state) Department and CAB anxious conclude
bilateral air transport agreement with China soonest
possible ...
Telegram, Acting Secretary of State Dean Acheson to
the Ambassador in China, Stuart Leighton, August 9,
1946
I.

The Background

THE DRAGON AND THE EAGLE

The saga of Sino-U.S. air services began informally over
thirty-seven years ago when the "China Clipper" of Pan
American extended its pioneer mail route across the Pacific to
Hong Kong in an effort to connect with the network of the nowdefunct China National Aviation Corporation (CNAC) on the
Chinese Mainland. 1 It was not until nine years later, in 1946, that
the Nationalist government officially came to terms with the
United States on an agreement which provided for flights between
the two countries. 2 In the following year, CNAC- as flag carrier
designated by China - began to operate twice weekly from
Shanghai to San Francisco via Honolulu. At the other end,
Northwest Airlines and Pan American applied for and obtained
permission to serve the Mainland. Operations to Shanghai
commenced in the same year. 3
The Communist takeover of China in 1949 brought an
untimely end to the growing traffic between the Chinese
Mainland and the United States. However, the 1946 Sino-U.S. Air
Agreement was never formally repudiated by the United States or
the PRC. Instead, with an Exchange of Notes in 1969, the
Republic of China (ROC) and the United States amended the
1. CNAC was a Sino-U.S. joint venture airline formed in China in 1930. In
March 1933, Pan Am acquired the entire American share in the company.
2. Agreement on Air Transport, December 20, 1946, United States-China, 61
Stat. 2799, T.I.A.S. No. 1609, 22 U.N.T.S. 87. On February 26, 1972, the two
countries also came to agreement on relief from double taxation on eamings from
the airline operations. 23 U.S.T. 129, T.I.A.S. No. 7282.
3. For detailed account of the China route award to the U.S. carriers, see
Pacific Case, 7 C.A.B. 209 (1946).
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Agreement to enable a new air service to function between Taipei,
Taiwan and the west coast of the U.S. 4 Under a Foreign Air
Carrier Permit issued by the U.S. Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB),
China Airlines - flag carrier of the ROC - began its first
operations from Taiwan to the United States in 1969, and
currently it serves the three U.S. cities of Honolulu, San Francisco
and Los Angeles. On the American side, Northwest, TWA and
Flying Tiger were initially given authority under the new
amendment to operate into Taiwan on a regular basis.
The twenty-two year air incommunicado with Mainland
China finally came to an end when two aircraft belonging to TWA
and Saturn Airlines, respectively, made their historical landings
in Peking in 1971 to pave the way for President Nixon's first visit
to the PRC. 5 Thereafter, events took a sudden turn for the better.
Following a series of measures by the Administration which
removed virtually all restrictions - collectively known as
"Transportation Order Two" - on U.S. citizen and aircraft
travels to the Chinese Mainland, the American people and airlines
are now theoretically able to visit the China Mainland again. 6 The
sale of ten Boeing 707s in 1972 helped break the barrier even
further. With the progressive normalization of U.S.-PRC diplomatic, trade and cultural relations, the stage seemed set for the
resumption of bilateral air services.
In this spirit the delegation from the U.S. National Council
for U.S.-China Trade to the PRC in 1973 conveyed to the Chinese
its hope and willingness to encourage the "development, step by
step, of reciprocal ... air services ... " which it considers as
fundamental to the " ... progressive development of trade and
economic relations ... " between the two countries. 7 Meanwhile,
in the hope of strengthening both their prestige and present route
structure, Pan American, TWA, United and Capital International
hurriedly filed applications with the CAB for the appropriate

4. Extension and Amendment, October 22, 1969, 20 U.S.T. 2985, T.I.A.S. No.
6773, 726 U.N.T.S. 320. China Airlines now operates to Honolulu, Los Angeles and
San Francisco.
5. Two U.S. Airlines Reach Peking, Av. WEEK & SPACE TEcH. [hereafter
AWST], February 7, 1972, at 23.
6. There May Soon Be New Ports of Call, The New York Times [hereafter
NYT], November 26, 1972.
7. The National Council for U.S.-China Trade, The Peking Report. Special
Report No. 6. Washington, D.C., 1974.
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operating authority to China. 8 However, in spite of zealous
response from U.S. carriers and some members of the Congress,
and the informal visit of the president of Pan American Airways
to China in 1974, plans for the inauguration of regular two-way
air traffic with the People's Republic have not materialized. Since
no direct regular air service currently exists between the American
continent and Chinese Mainland, U.S. and Canadian visitors to
China, as well as importers and exporters involved in the China
market, are constrained to use foreign airlines originating in
Japan, Pakistan, Europe and Africa. 9
THE

VIEW

FROM ROC

By contrast, however, American travellers have been calling
on Taiwan with a minimum of inconvenience. At present at least
three airlines, including an American carrier, are operating
regularly between the U.S. and Taiwan; and traffic load factors
have been impressive. For China Airlines alone, the number of
passengers flown on the U.S.-ROC route doubled and cargo
tonnage increased 160% over a period of five years. In 1977 this
route not only contributed substantially to the airline's $20 million
net earnings, it helped finance the purchase of four Boeing 747s. 10
Understandably, the Nationalist Chinese are elated that
American fantasy for direct air link with the People's Republic
has thus far ended in frustration. To them reopening of the U.S.PRC route might mean the end of the air transport agreement and
services between the U.S. and the island Republic. The repercussions, in that case, would go beyond simple financial loss. Among
a total of twelve air transport agreements which presently exist
between the ROC and foreign countries, the Sino-American
Agreement is the only one which was concluded on a permanent
and formal basis.U To the Nationalists, therefore, it has symbolic
8. The four cases now pending decision are: Pan American, No. 2439D-1;
TWA, No. 24816, 24074; United Airlines, No. 21779; Capital International Airways,
No. 25978. All references to dockets are those as filed at the Civil Aeronautics
Board, Washington, D.C.
9. At present Japan Airlines, Pakistan International Airlines, Air France,
Swissair, Iran Air, Tarom and Ethiopian Airlines (and Aeroflot, Civil Aviation
Administration of DPRK as well) operate to China.
10. See For Airline Read Diplomat, FAR EASTERN EcoN. REV. (Hong Kong)
January 20, 1978, at 57.
11. The Republic of China now has standing provisional civil air agreement
with South Korea, Singapore and Indonesia. Air transport agreements have also
been reached with civil aeronautical authorities of Nauru and Saudi Arabia. The
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significance as a demonstration of continual acceptance by the
international aviation community. 12 More significantly, it is also
the hallmark of long-standing political, economic and cultural
relationships between Taiwan and the United States. Indeed, at a
time when ROC's self-perceived destiny is increasingly threatened
by worldwide political isolation and normalization of American
relations with Peking, any change in the Sino-U.S. Air Agreement
of 1946 prior to official "de-recognition" can adversely affect
confidence in the Island at home and abroad; this the ROC
Government cannot afford. Thus, the continuing existence of the
Agreement in its present form becomes an imperative - a sign of
United States reassurance- the absence of which forebodes the
beginning of an end to U.S. support and Nationalist rule in
Taiwan.
THE BEST OF Two WORLDS?

In the long run, however, all parties concerned -the U.S.,
PRC and even ROC - would agree that resumption of air services
between the American and Chinese mainland is inevitable. The
question is only one of "when" and "how." Much, of course,
depends on U.S. strategy toward normalization of relations with
Peking. But, whether resumption is now or after diplomatic
recognition of the PRC, the Carter administration would want to
preserve various ties with Taiwan, if only to protect U.S.
investments which amount to over $550 million. Moreover, the
American public is supportive of continuing relations with the
ROC. In that context, sustainment of the existing air link with
Taiwan is clearly necessary and conducive to the U.S. interest. 13
What, then, are the realistic prospects of opening up the PRC
air route while maintaining the status quo in U.S.-ROC aviation
relations? The pages that follow examine that question as well as
the intricacies and problems inherent in this facet of a truly
remaining six air agreements were signed by China Airlines on a private
contractual level. The other six airlines are Philippines Airlines, Malaysian
Airlines System, Thai Airways International, Ltd, Cathay Pacific Airways, Japan
Asia Airways and Luxembourg Airways. See China Airlines, Head Office, Taipei,
Taiwan, A Summary of Contents of Our Nation's Present Air Transport
Agreements (unpublished document originally dated November 27, 1972); see also
subsequent undate in Central Daily News (Taipei), March 29, 1977.
12. Taiwan is not a member of ICAO; and China Airlines is not an lATA
member.
13. See L1, DE-RECOGNIZING TAIWAN: THE LEGAL PROBLEMS 31-32 (Washington, D.C.; Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1977).
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unique triangular relationship. The focus is on the domestic and
international legal complexities involved, the decisive role of the
U.S. president and the reach of law and politics in ultimate
decision-making under the circumstances. For the purposes of the
present analysis, the author has made two assumptions. First, the
ongoing normalization process will culminate in U.S. recognition
of the PRC as the sole legitimate government of China in the very
near future. Second, the issues of blocked assets and U.S. private
claims will be amicably and satisfactorily resolved between the
two nations in the process so that the single major barrier to
resumption of bilateral air services will be effectively removed.

II. American Law, Foreign Policy and International Aviation
A QuESTION OF BEFORE AND AFTER

As with other areas where the U.S. is seeking reapprochment
with the PRC, the problem of maintaining simultaneous air ties
with Peking and Taiwan may be best examined by juxtaposing
American objectives and obstacles which develop before
recognition with those which emerge subsequent to it. Before
recognition, the proposition is essentially one of opening up the
Mainland China air route in the absence of formal diplomatic
relations with Peking, and in the face of existing U.S. treaty
commitments to Taiwan. The problem takes on a different
dimension after the U.S. has officially recognized Peking.
Assuming at that point in time air services to the PRC already
exist, or are in fact in the offing, a difficult situation is presented
-somewhat reversed from the former- in which the U.S. will be
attempting to preserve aviation relations with Taiwan as a "derecognized" friendly regime whose international status as well as
treaty relations with the U.S. will be in doubt. By and large,
prospective American commercial and economic agreements with
the PRC will face problems of a similar nature.
Under those circumstances, congressional action in one form
or another may be expected to resolve the complex legal issues, or
in the appropriate case, to implement presidential decisions. In
some cases, the President may be given statutory authority to act
but he does not necessarily have a free hand. In extending most
favored nation (MFN) treatment, and in lowering import duties on
Communist bloc nations, for instance, the presidential mandate is
fettered by conditions of limitations imposed by the Congress. 14
14. Pub. L. No. 93-618; see, in particular, Title IV of the Act.
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This, however, is not the case when an exchange of commercial
rights in international civil aviation is involved. In that situation,
from the negotiation of a bilateral agreement pertaining to air
transport to final authorization of designated foreign and U.S.
airlines to operate the services agreed upon, the President plays a
decisive role which effectively puts such matters beyond the reach
of the Senate and the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB). His prowess
is derived not only from congressional acquiescence, but also from
constitutional and statutory sources.
PRESIDENTIAL PREROGATIVE IN INTERNATIONAL AVIATION

Under contemporary international law and prevailing
national legislation, every nation has complete sovereignty over
its air space. 15 Thus far, that has not deterred transnational air
travel. In order to facilitate international air commerce, nations
met in Chicago in 1944 to work out a multinational solution.
Unable to reach consensus on the subject of exchange of traffic
rights, the Chicago Convention resolved that no scheduled
international air services may be operated over or into the
territory of a contracting state without permission of that state. 16
Over a hundred and forty nations, including the United States
have signed and ratified that Convention. 17 All have accepted
bilateral agreements as standard practice in the exchange of
commercial aviation rights. Consequently, the present
international air route system of the U.S. is founded on a web of
some fifty bilateral civil air transport agreements each of which
sets out the kinds of operating rights given, the routes authorized
and the mechanism by which rates are determined.
Although the U.S. Constitution and statutes do not
specifically define this power and function, the President has
always entered into bilateral air transport agreements with
foreign countries in his capacity as Chief Executive, exercising his
constitutional authority to conduct foreign affairs for the United
States. For some time, this practice has been endorsed by the
Justice Department, with acquiescence by the Congress. The

15. Convention on International Civil Aviation, 1944, Chicago, 61 Stat. 1180,
T.I.A.S. No. 1591, 51 U.N.T.S. 295; 49 U.S.C. 1508(a). In China's case, see PRC's
Declaration Regarding Territorial Waters, September 4, 1958 in 8 CHUNG·HUA
JENMIN KUNG-HO·KUO FA·KUEI HUI·PIEN 112-13 (COMPENDIUM OF LAws AND
REGULATIONS OF THE PEoPLE's REPUBLIC OF CHINA) [hereafter FKHP].
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result is that, as executive agreements, air bilaterals are not
subject to Senate ratification. 18
The President, however, does not simply "rubberstamp" these
commercial aviation agreements. While he familiarizes himself
with the economics involved by the participation of the CAB, the
President becomes involved in the negotiation through the office
of the Secretary of State. 19 Under the Federal Aviation Act, the
Secretary is required to advise the Board and the relevant
departments heads " ... concerning the negotiation of any
agreement with foreign governments for the establishment or
development of air navigation, including air routes and
services." 20 By deliberate congressional design, therefore, the
Secretary of State and U.S. foreign policy considerations are given
a dominant role in the negotiation process; because the Secretary
reports directly to the President, the latter is able to maintain
effective control.
FOREIGN

AIR

CARRIER PERMIT

This unique presidential mandate in international aviation is
complemented by the power of approval of a type of foreign airline
permit which the Congress has explicitly entrusted him.
Normally, before any foreign airline can operate into the U.S., it
must have received prior approval of the CAB. 21 Such approval
may be given in the form of a permit in one of two ways.
To begin with, there is Section 402 Foreign Air Carrier Permit which allows the recipient foreign carrier to engage in·
common carrier operations on a regular basis. 22 Under the Federal
16. Convention, Art. 6, supra note 15.
17. Information from Legal Bureau, ICAO, May 1978.
18. See WHITEMAN, 14 DIG. OF INT'L LAw 221-22 (Washington, DC.: Dept. of
State 1968).
19. Calkins, Acquisition of Operating Authority by Foreign Air Carriers: The
Role of the CAB, White House and Department of State, 31 J. AIR L.&CoM. 65
(1965); see also HEYMANN, THE U.S.·SOVIET CIVIL AIR AGREEMENT FROM
INCEPTION TO INAUGURATION: A CASE STUDY (Santa Monica: RAND, 1972).
20. 49 u.s.c. 1462 (1958).
21. Calkins, supra note 19; Gillilland, The Role of the Civil Aeronautics Board
in Licensing Foreign Air Carriers, 32 J. AIR L. & CoM. 236 (1966). The Secretary of
State, pursuant to 49 U.S.C. 1508(a), may authorize CAAC aircraft to bring U.N.
Chinese or its own diplomatic mission personnel to the U.S. solely for that purpose.
22. Common carrier is a transportation line engaged in the business of
handling persons or goods for compensation and for all persons on an impartial
basis. In the case of an air carrier, it allows carriage of individually ticketed
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Aviation Act, the Board is charged with the responsibility of
holding a hearing and determining whether the foreign carrier is
"fit, willing and able," and if the proposed services should be
authorized in the public interest. In exercising this authority, it is
required to act in a "manner consistent with international
obligations assumed by the U.S." 23 In practice, it means that a
Section 402 permit is almost always granted whenever a
designated foreign carrier applies pursuant to a bilateral air
transport agreement. Foreign airlines may, of course, apply for
such a permit even though there is no such underlying agreement,
or when permission is only sought for charter operations. 24
Under Section 801 of the Act, however, Board action on such
application (whether it be a denial or otherwise) is subject to
presidential approval. Contrary to traditional concepts of
administrative legal process, presidential action, in this instance,
is expressly exempted from judicial review by virtue of Section
1006 of the Act. Under these conditions, therefore, both the Board
and the judiciary have a severely limited role.
The same statutory provisions also enable the President, even
in the absence of a reciprocal agreement, to permit a foreign air
carrier to operate regularly into the U.S. for foreign policy reasons
without fear of subjecting himself to the checks and balances
inherent in the constitutional system. As with his control over
commercial aviation agreements, the constitutionality of this
presidential prerogative has not been successfully challenged. 25 In
the recent decision of Diggs v. Civil Aeronautics Board, 26 the U.S.
Court of Appeal for the District of Columbia specifically held that
"the clear and unambiguous language in Section 1006(a) ... of
the Act" deprives it of jurisdiction to review an order challenged
thereunder on either statutory or constitutional grounds.

passengers, and advertising itself as a common carrier. In contrast, a contract
carrier is any carrier not a common carrier who, under special and individual
contracts or agreements, transport persons or property for compensation.
23. 49 U.S.C. 1592. The obligation is on the Board only, and not on the U.S.
President.
24. WHITEMAN, 9 DIG. OF INT'L LAw 65Q-51 (1968).
25. Chicago and S. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103 (1948);
Colonial Airlines v. Adams, 87 F. Supp. 242, 243 (D.D.C. 1949). Recently, the
Aviation Consumer Action Project (ACAP), a Ralph Nader Mfiliate, filed action in
U.S. District Court in Washington D.C. to challenge the validity of Bermuda II on
a constitutionality basis. See THE TRAVEL AGENT, April 10, 1978, at 10, 12.
26. 516 F.2d 1248 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
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PERMIT UNDER SECTION 1108(B)
Under the Act, the Board may also issue a more restrictive
type of permit which severely curtails the nature, scope and
duration of a foreign air carrier's intended operations into the
U.S. 27 Generally this permit - known as a Foreign Aircraft
Permit under Section 1108(b) of the Act - is issued after a
determination of reciprocity, and finding of compliance with
public interest and international obligations. While it resembles a
Section 402 permit in this respect, it differs from the latter in that
it authorizes only nonscheduled and contract (or private) carrier
services. 28
More significantly, here the legislature has seen fit to limit
direct presidential control over international aviation. Hence, not
only does the Act provide that a Section 1108(b) permit may be
issued without the approval of the President, it also affords
"interested parties" the opportunity to seek judicial review of
Board actions. Under certain circumstances a foreign carrier may
prefer a Section 1108(b) to a Section 402 permit if only to avoid an
arbitrary and judicially irreversible decision by the President.
That will not be the case in the present U.S.-PRC context,
however. Indeed, if mutual air services were to become a fait
accompli prior to recognition of the PRC, Presidential action
through an executive agreement and permit approval under
Section 402 of the Act will be crucial. Inasmuch as improved air
communication with the PRC is an integral part of American
foreign policy toward simultaneous relations with Peking and
Taipei, it would require the kind of flexibility and complete
executive aplomb which characterize those two legal mechanisms.
In one sense, there, too, is where "law" makes way for "politics".

III.

U.S.-PRC Air Service Before Diplomatic Recognition
"RECIPROCITY AND INTERNATIONAL COMITY"

Although normally neither the U.S. nor PRC would conclude
an air transport agreement with another country in the absence of
diplomatic recognition, there is no reason why they would not
make an exception for each other in this instance if they consider
it politically expedient, and if such an agreement will not hamper

27. Supra note 24.
28. 49 u.s.c. 1508(b).
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the reconciliation process. 29 Ideally, of course, the blocked assets
problem should have been satisfactorily resolved so that, based on
a bilateral aviation agreement entered into by the President, the
CAB will routinely make a finding of public interest and approve
a Section 402 permit authorizing the Chinese airline (CAAC)
regular operation into the United States. 30
In the event that an air transport agreement cannot be
reached for some reason, the Board may still issue a Section 402
permit on the basis of "reciprocity and international comity" upon
CAAC application. Initially, this approach had been adopted by
the Board in cases where foreign airlines were seeking entry after
underlying bilateral agreements had lapsed. 31 More recently, it
has been applied even where there has been no bilateral
agreement previously. In his approval of a Section 402 permit to
Air Nauru, for example, a CAB Administrative Law Judge
specifically observed that there had been no bilateral agreement,
and thus " ... considerations of comity and reciprocity between
the two governments with respect to air transportation matters
form the most persuasive single element favoring an award ... " 32
Even on the assumption that the Board acted unfavorably on
the application, it will not effectively deter CAAC's entry into the
U.S. As previously indicated, the matter ultimately is one of
presidential prerogative. The President's power of approval under
Section 801 is therefore the final fail-safe.
THE NATIONALISTS UPROAR

Whether or not efforts to revamp the U.S.-PRC air route will
come to any fruition before recognition of Peking, the Carter
Administration must anticipate strong opposition from the
Republic of China. As early as 1970, when the then President of
Pan American Airways, Najeeb Halaby, revealed his Company's

29. There are presently no U.S. statutory provisions to prevent such action.
Indeed, even a trade agreement with the PRC may be concluded prior to
recognition. A trade agreement between the U.K. and the U.S.S.R. in 1921 prior to
mutual recognition is one example of international precedent. Note, however, that
Whiteman states that the conclusion of a bilateral treaty " ... does constitute
recognition." 2 DIG. OF INT'L LAw 52 (1968).
30. Whiteman, supra note 24, at 655-58; see also Calkins, supra note 19. CAAC
represents General Administration of Civil Aviation of China.
31. Whiteman, supra note 24, at 659-63.
32. See Order 71-7-31, July 7, 1971, C.A.B. Docket No. 23045.
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plan to operate to the Mainland "in the immediate future," the
Nationalists responded instantly with a vehement denouncement.
In particular, the ROC rejected outright any possibility of a U.S.
carrier acquiring such operational rights under the 1946 Agreement. 33 Its argument, although not stated explicitly in any official
protest to the U.S., was founded primarily on its claim to be the
sole legitimate government of China recognized by the United
States, and on the Latin maxims of Pacta sunt servanda
(Agreements must be observed) and Pacta tertiis nee nocent nee
prosunt (Treaties are neither of benefit to or detriment to third
parties) which are well-established principles of the law of
nations.
As a precautionary measure against any Communist Chinese
attempts to revive the defunct air link, the Civil Aviation
Administration (CAA) of the ROC notified its Ministry of Foreign
Mfairs to petition the CAB of the United States for an Order to
cancel the foreign air carrier permit which had been issued to
CNAC (the now nonexistent airline that originally had operated a
U.S.-Mainland service but was dissolved by the Nationalist
Government as it migrated to Taiwan in 1949). 34 By Order
71-2-80, served on February 17, 1971, the Board directed any
interested parties to "show cause" why the Board should not
cancel the permit issued to CNAC. Since no objections were filed,
the Board acted pursuant to Sections 204(a), 402(f) of the Act, and
under Docket 23110 concluded that it was in "the public's interest
to cancel" said permit.
The situation seven and a half years later is somewhat
different. Now Taiwan is being confronted with a firm conviction
shared by both the U.S. and the PRC that renewed bilateral
operations will be in their best interest. Consequently, ROC
leaders have no doubts that the threat is very real. In desperation,
they are expected to invoke treaty provisions and accuse the U.S.
of breach of agreement. The Exchange of Notes amending the
Sino-American Air Agreement on October 22, 1969 unequivocally
stated that: "[r]outes 1, 2, 3 in Section A and B of the Annex to the
Agreement shall not be operated without prior consultation and
agreement between the two countries." (emphasis added) 35
33. Looking at Pan American's Illusion {rom the Sino· U.S. Air Transport
Agreement, Min-chu wan-pao (Taipei), March 20, 1970.
34. The ROC action was not made public in Taiwan but reported only in the
U.S., see AWST, March 1, 1971, at 27.
35. Extension and Amendment, Art. 4, supra note 4.
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Based on this provision, the Republic of China is entitled to be
consulted on any U.S. decision to negotiate with the PRC on air
services to the Mainland; it would be a violation of treaty
obligation on the part of the U.S. if it ventures to reach an
agreement with the PRC in the absence of ROC consent.
Additionally, the ROC may interpret any decision by the
Board to issue a permit to CAAC (under either section 402 or
1108(b)) for the purpose of initiating a. U.S.-Mainland China air
service as a contravention of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958.
Although under the Act the CAB is empowered to execute those
authorizations by following the prescribed procedure, relevant
parts of section 1102 and 1108(b) require that: " ... in exercising
and performing their powers and duties under (this Act), the
Board . . . shall do so consistently with any obligation assumed
by the United States in any treaty, convention, or agreement that
may be in force between the United States and any foreign
country." (emphasis added) The issuance of either a section 402 or
1108(b) permit to CAAC without observing the provision contained in the Exchange of Notes of 1969 could be considered as
"inconsistent" with the Agreement of 1946 and thus a breach of
domestic U.S. laws.
THE U.S. POSITION

The Nationalist Chinese position is, nevertheless, undermined
by a number of factors. In the first place, in coming to an
agreement with the PRC on the exchange of air traffic rights, the
United States is acting in accordance with international law and
practice. Under the Chicago Convention to which both the U.S.
and PRC are signatories, "no scheduled international air service
may be operated over or into the territory of a contracting state,
except with the special permission or other authorization of that
state ... "It cannot be denied that the PRC has sovereignty over
the territory for which traffic rights are being sought. But equally
important, the governing organ of the Convention - the
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)- has formally
recognized the PRC as the sole legitimate government representing China. Since the U.S. has acquiesced in this act, 36 it is
36. The U.S. has not protested informally or formally against the PRC's
ratification of the Chicago Convention as it did when the latter joined the Warsaw
Convention. In the U.S. TREATIES IN FoRcE (1968), the PRC was listed as a party
to the Warsaw Convention, but the following footnote was inserted: "The

THE DRAGON AND THE EAGLE

19

only proper for the latter to negotiate directly with Peking on any
commercial aviation rights pertaining to the Chinese Mainland.
Secondly, and in theory, careful reading of the 1946 Agreement enables the U.S. to effectively circumvent the key provision
in the Exchange of Notes of 1969 which requires "prior
consultation and agreement" between the U.S. and ROC on the
redevelopment of China routes. It should be pointed out that such
rights of consultation extend only to" ... route 1, 2, 3 in Section A
and 3 of the Annex." Significantly, the traffic points on Chinese
territory along those routes include merely the cities of Shanghai,
Tientsin, and Canton. Peking, for instance, was not mentioned. 37
This would mean that a U.S.-PRC discussion on mutual air
services with Peking as the point of origin or coterminal point
would be theoretically outside the ambit of the provision, and
hence sufficient to exclude any interference or claims on the part
of Taiwan under the 1946 Agreement. Under these circumstances,
also, the Board will not be in breach of Section 1102 or 1108(b) for
acting inconsistently with U.S. treaty obligations. Even if the
Board did violate Section 1102 in a Section 402 proceeding,
Section 1006, we have seEm earlier on, exempt it from judicial
reach.
While this approach may be perfectly legal, it is not
necessarily feasible, and possibly not acceptable to either the PRC
or ROC for each will deem it an affront to its dignity. Perhaps
most important of all, both Peking and Taipei are likely to view
such strained interpretation of the Agreement as being unscrupulous and devious of the U.S. Inevitably, it puts U.S. credibility on
the line. At a time when problems persist in U.S.-Soviet relations,
and in Africa as well as in the Middle East. Washington simply
cannot afford to pay the price.
In revamping the China air route, the Administration can
only proceed with tact. Given that, however, if an agreement on
the exchange of traffic rights can be reached with the PRC which
stresses the spirit of the Shanghai Communique while begging the
derecognition issue, chances are that Taiwan will accept it
although only grudgingly. To the extent China Airlines' invest-

Government of the United States does not recognize the so-called People's Republic
of China . . . and therefore it regards . . . adherences to this Convention as being
without legal effect and attaches no significance thereto." This footnote has been
deleted in TREATIES IN FORCE (1977) and (1978).
37. Annex to the Agreement, Art. A, supra note 4.
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ments and revenue are heavily U.S.-centered, and there are no
effective means to stop the Americans from initiating bilateral air
services with the Chinese People's Republic and from travelling to
Taiwan, (if necessary, via non-U.S. airlines) Taiwan is clearly not
in a strong bargaining position vis-a-vis the U.S.
IV. Problems and Perspectives After Recognition
DIPLOMATIC RECOGNITION OF PEKING
The foregoing situation, of course, would have been different,
and the arguments therein inapplicable if the U.S. had extended
diplomatic recognition to the PRC. Insofar as the latter is
concerned, the issue of diplomatic recognition has always played
a tacit but significant role in its civil air agreements. A survey of
the official treaties of the PRC reveals that it has not yet signed
an agreement of this nature with a nation with whom it has no
prior diplomatic or even consular relations. 38 It is therefore quite
possible that the Chinese would follow the rule rather than the
exception when it comes to such an agreement with the U.S. prior
to recognition, unless, as indicated previously, they find it so
politically expedient that they decide to deviate from established
practice.
Diplomatic recognition of Peking, however, has other signifi·
cance in the present context. To begin with, formal recognition of
the PRC would have necessitated an early settlement of the
blocked assets and private claims issues to mutual satisfaction.
More important, the extension of de jure recognition to the PRC
would result in its withdrawal from Taiwan. One view is that the
legal effect is to restore the island Republic to the PRC, and render
all its previous treaties and agreements with the U.S. inoperative.
It also follows that the 1946 ROC-U.S. Air Transport Agreement
would lose its legal meaning and effect. In that case, there need be
no squabbling over the interpretation of the 1946 Agreement and
the Federal Aviation Act as it relates to the re-establishment of
U.S.-China air services. The U.S. and PRC presumably would
negotiate a new agreement.
STATE SUCCESSION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
Another view is that the present Chinese government - the
PRC - is bound by the principle of "state succession" in
38. Only in one case did the PRC conclude an air agreement with a country
with which it had only consular relations - with Laos in 1962.
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international law to honor and abide by a bilateral agreement
entered into by a predecessor government. The notion is based, in
part, on a distinction drawn by some Western legal scholars between
a new "government" and a new "state." 39 The idea is essentially
that a newly created "state" inherits neither the benefit nor the
burden from a former state. Instead, it begins with a "clean slate."
The opposite is true of a new "government" which exists under the
same "state," and the PRC can fall into that category. So the
argument is this: Admittedly, the government did change hands in
1949 but, arguably, it has not affected China's international status
and its rights and obligations as a sovereign "state." Thus, as the
succeeding government, the PRC inherits previous commitments of
the state.
O'Connell, the prominent Australian jurist, came to a similar
conclusion favoring "state succession" by virtue of a "continuity" or
status quo approach. In his opinion, change of sovereignty in
practice has little effect on subsequent air policies. The new
government normally continues to extend to the other country
commercial traffic rights under the original bilateral agreement,
although very often a new agreement and new permits are
negotiated and issued at a later date. O'Connell ultimately
concludes that "there has therefore been almost universal
continuity of air transport agreement[s], enduring for at least the
period normally covered by termination." 40
Taking either one of the preceding two views on "state
succes8ion," it would seem that international law, after all, does
provide an answer to the present problem. As definitive as these
views may have been, they have outlived their heyday inasmuch as
they oversimplify the political forces, cultural values and
developmental experiences which have brought about the change of
government in the first place, and the emergence of many new
nation-states in the recent decades. Moreover, those views can only
thrive on the logic and assumption that rules and precedents of
international law will be determinative, or followed in a like
situation today. In reality, of course, one can only hope that it be so.
In the absence of effective sanction, international law can only be

39. See O'CoNNELL, THE LAw OF STATE SuccESSION (1956); Tabata, The
Independence of Singapore and Her Succession to the Agreement between Japan
and Malaysia for Air Services, 12 JAPANESE ANNALS OF INT'L L. 36 (1968).
40. O'Connell, STATE SuccESSION IN MUNICIPAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAw
329-34 (1967).
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what nations make it out to be; because of the changing times and
the diversity in identity, interest and ideology among world nations,
there can only be but different views and acceptance of these
principles. The PRC's perception, in this regard, is deeply influenced
by bitter experiences of the past, and its resultant conversion to
Marxist-Leninist ideology. Adopting a very utilitarian concept of
law in general, the PRC looks upon international law essentially as
an instrument in reaching the optimum in a given problem
situation. 41
CHINESE PERSPECTIVES OF "SUCCESSION"

In dealing with the question of whether under international law,
it should be bound by treaty and international obligations of the prerevolutionary government, for instance, the People's Republic of
China has felt it best to reserve its options. Accordingly, Article 55 of
the Common Program of the Chinese People's Political Consultative
Committee, which was promulgated in 1949, declared, inter alia,
that the ". . . Central Peoples' Government of the People's Republic
of China must study the treaties and agreements concluded by the
Kuomingtang (KMT) government with foreign governments, and
depending on their contents, recognize, abrogate, revise, or renew
them." 42 (emphasis added)
Despite the lack of a general hard and fast rule in determining
the validity of agreements concluded by the Nationalist
Government prior to 1949, however, it can be safely predicted that
the PRC will not act favorably toward any alleged rights and
obligations arising from the Air Transport Agreement of 1946.
First of all, the Central Committee of the Communist Party has
asserted in a statement on February 1, 1947 that the People's
Republic would not bear "any obligation for any. . . treaties [or]. . .
agreements of understanding" entered into by the Nationalist
Government which would "disgrace the country and strip it of its
rights." According to this statement, "form[ation] of treaties
regarding special rights in commerce, navigation, aviation, and
other special economic and legal rights" would be included.
41. For the PRC's attitude towards international law in general, see HsiUNG,
LAw AND PoLicY IN CHINA's FoREIGN RELATIONS, (1972).
42. 1 CHUNG-HUA JEN-MIN KUNG-HO KUO TUI-WAI KUAN-HSI WENCHIEN CHI 1 (Compilation of documents relating to the foreign relations of the
People's Republic of China), English translation in the IMPORTANT DocUMENTS OF
THE FIRST PLENARY SESSION OF THE CHINESE PEOPLE'S POLITICAL CoNSULTATIVE
CoNFERENCE 19-20 (Peking, 1949).
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(emphasis added) 43 The rationale behind this declaration is twofold. Basically it was a formal act on the part of the revolutionary
government to denounce the Nationalists as the "corrupt and
delinquent" regime which had been "selling out" China to
aggressive Imperialists. The Central Committee was making
references to a series of treaties and agreements which were
concluded between China and various foreign powers in 1946.
Clearly, the 1946 Air Transport Agreement with the United States
was included among them, although the U.S. Department of State
had indicated that it merely regarded it as a "purely commercial
aviation" agreement which made "no provision for base rights for
either government in the territory of the other." 44
The other rationale is somewhat related to the first; it stems
from the PRC's intense dislike of "Unequal Treaties." To the
Chinese, unequal treaties are remnants of a humiliating past
which "undermine the most fundamental principle of international law - the principle of Sovereignty - and therefore they are
illegal and void, and states have the right to abrogate this type of
treaty at any time." (emphasis added) 45 As one PRC writer on
trade and international agreements wrote: "Whether or not a
treaty is equal does not depend on the form and words of various
treaty provisions, but on the state character, economic strength,
and the substance of the conditions of the contracting states."
(emphasis added) 46 Following this line of reasoning, "unequal"
treaties would include not only the classic agreement signed under
duress, or "at gun point," but also one in which political and
economic factors were not given due consideration. Based on this
assertion, it is possible that People's China may condemn the 1946
bilateral air agreement as an "unequal treaty" since its legality is
vitiated by the disproportionate political, economic and aviation
strength of the parties involved at that time, even though traffic
rights were seemingly exchanged on a reciprocal basis and there
was no evidence of actual coercion.

43. References quoted in Steiner, The Mainsprings of Chinese Communist
Foreign Policy, 44 AM. J. INT'L L. 93 (Jan., 1950); see also CoHEN AND CHIU, II
CHINA'S PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 1121 (1974).
44. United States Relations with China, with Special Reference to the Period
1944-1949, at 224-25 (U.S. Dep't of State, 1949).
45. Chiu, Comparison of the Nationalist and Communist Chinese Views of
Unequal Treaties, 19 Studies in Chinese Law 259, n.81, 82 (Harvard Law School).
46. Wang Yao-t'ien, KUO-CHI MAO-I T'IAO-YUEH HO HSIEH-TING 31
(International trade treaties and agreements, Peking, 1958).
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Secondly, the terms of the 1946 Agreement constitute in
themselves a strong deterrent against adherence by the PRC. In
order to shield its relatively new carrier from unlimited interline
competition, the People's Republic has generally subscribed to a
"restrictive" international aviation policy in its bilateral air
agreements. 47 In addition to being state-run, the Chinese airlineCAAC - has adopted such means as predetermination of
capacity and frequency, and strict governmental monitoring of
tariffs to control its markets. For the PRC to accept the original
Sino-U.S. Agreement containing virtually all the liberal principles
of the "Bermuda Conference" (which provides for ex post facto
review of capacity by individual carriers, and lATA (International
Air Transport Association) as rate-setting machinery) would be to
forsake the basic ideological and economic themes which underlie
its policy and practice in international air transport. 48
The 1946 Air Transport Agreement also furnishes the United
States with " ... [r]ights of transit and nontraffic stop in Chinese
territory, as well as the right to pick up and discharge international traffic in passengers, cargo and mail at Shanghai, Tientsin,
Canton (and Peking on a temporary basis) as well as at such
additional points as may be agreed upon from time to time" on
three separate Pacific and Atlantic routes. (emphasis added) In
addition, "United States carriers will be authorized to serve
additional traffic points in Chinese territory as soon as the
carriers of any third country are so authorized.... " (emphasis
added) 49 Both of these provisions - one enabling extensive route
concessions and the other an "MFN" clause in aviation rights are unprecedented in PRC practice. They will not be any less
objectionable after recognition by the U.S.
ROC

AFI'ER DERECOGNITION

As previously indicated, derecognition of ROC also brings
into focus the problem of maintaining its present air link with the
U.S. If recognition of Peking has the effect of annulment on the

47. See J. Young, Bilateralism: Some Chinese Perspectives of International
Law of Air Transport (1977) (unpublished manuscript, Stanford Law School); King
& Roosevelt, Civil Aviation Agreements of the People's Republic of China 14
HARV. INT'L L.J. 316 (1973).
48. The PRC is currently considering membership in lATA. It is especially
interested in the Clearinghouse arrangement.
49. Exchange of notes on December 20, 1946, Paragraph (d), supra note 4.
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U.S.-China Air Agreement of 1946, what, then, is the legal basis
for continuing aviation relations with Taipei? Since Article 6 of
the Chicago Convention stipulates that "no scheduled international air service may be operated over or into the territory of a
contracting state without its special permission ... ,"will the U.S.
be so obligated to directly negotiate with Peking?
The answers to these questions are by no means clear, and at
best, conjectural. Quite obviously, the U.S.-PRC-Taiwan scenerio
is unique and was not originally contemplated or foreseen when
the Chicago Convention, or when the traditional concepts of state
succession and recognition came into being. In reality, also, there
are no legal precedents governing the present situation.so
Arguably, one can therefore be pragmatic and innovative in
resolving the issues at hand.
At the outset, there is no reason (if sound in policy) why the
U.S. cannot legally extend a limited form of recognition to Taiwan
subsequent to establishing formal diplomatic relations with
Peking. It is possible that as long as the Nationalist Government
is in de facto control of Taiwan and its population, and still
engages in foreign relations, the island may be deemed to have
acquired an independent international legal existence. 51 From the
U.S. point of view, this would be the realistic approach. To
Washington, the "form" in which Taiwan then may choose to
exist is not particularly important; and its independent existence
need not be specifically defined. 5 2 Rather, it is more important, for
preser.t purposes, for the U.S. to stress the concept that although
Taiwan cannot legally represent China Proper, it can be viewed
technically as an entity in its own right, within its own
geographical limits and area of competency. On this premise it
necessarily follows that, in order to obtain air traffic rights into
Taiwan, the U.S. will have to approach Taipei and not Peking.
In so doing, the U.S. will also be acting in a manner
consistent with the Chicago Convention of 1944. It is not disputed
50. Although a similar situation existed when Japan and the PRC concluded
an air agreement in 1974, neither side specifically invoked legal principles
stemming from the Chicago Convention. Previously, Japan only had a provisional
commercial air agreement with Taiwan.
51. This view is endorsed in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FoREIGN
RELATIONS LAw OF THE UNITED STATES§ 4 (1965); see also Convention on Rights
and Duties of States, Montevideo, December 26, 1933, 49 Stat. 3097, 16 L.N.T.S. 19.
Article 1 of the Convention specified similar qualifications for statehood.
52. This is within the spirit and language of the Shanghai Communique.
Being deliberately vague and open, it avoids unnecessary complications.
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that Article 6 does require special permission or authorization of
the contracting state for scheduled flights over its territory.
However, the Convention has defined territory to be" ... the land
areas and territorial waters adjacent thereto under the sovereignty, suzerainty, protection or mandate of such state." (emphasis added) Further, pursuant to Article 1, every state has complete
and exclusive sovereignty only over the air space above its
territory. Since it is Taiwan's territory and air space that are in
question, and the PRC strictly does not have effective control nor
sovereign rights over it, the U.S. need not obtain permission from
Peking for air traffic rights to and from the island state.
The fact that after the Nationalists retreat from the Mainland
the 1946 Air Transport Agreement had been modified to apply
exclusively to the territory of Taiwan raises another interesting
possibility. 53 Since both parties evidently had intended the
Agreement to apply only to Taiwan, it may be argued that no
subsequent change of government or recognition can affect its
continued application. Indeed many international jurists, including Lord McNair, share the opinion that withdrawal or severance
of diplomatic recognition does not affect treaty relations between
the two parties. 54 According to this view, a mere political act or
gesture of policy like recognition cannot put asunder an agreement which is in essence a mutual manifestation of the desire to
be bound in a legal relationship. In the same vein, another view
suggests that, as a sheer political act, diplomatic recognition
should not affect non-political relationships. 5 5 Arguably the ROCU.S. air link is one such relationship.
If either one of these views is adopted, then, in theory, the
Taiwan air route and the legal framework within which it
operates would remain at status quo after recognition of Peking.
In practice, however, the PRC may not tolerate such an approach.
It may insist, for example, on the "Japan formula" in which case
U.S.-ROC air services can only be conducted on a private and
contractual level. This, in fact, is the current state of affairs in
aviation relations between the PRC, Japan and Taiwan. 56
53. Exchange of notes (amendment), December 20, 1950, T.I.A.S. No. 1609,
6773.
54. See also Oppenheim, I INTERNATIONAL LAW 939 (8th ed., 1955); see
RESTATEMENT § 98(2), supra note 51.
55. Li, supra note 13, at 33.
56. Currently Taiwan's China Airlines and a Japanese company, Japan Asia
Airways, operate the Japan-Taiwan route. CAAC and JAL now serve the PRC and
Japan.
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Whether it be the 1946 agreement as amended, or a completely
new agreement or the "Japan formula" for Taiwan, the U.S. is
likely to find the "balancing" act between Peking and Taipei both
difficult and challenging. If infuriated by an indiscreet American
move, the ROC government may risk its U.S. services and deny
access and flight information to all U.S. airlines operating
through its Flight Information Region (FIR) just as they had done
to the Japanese in 1974. 57 As a result of such ROC action, JAL
promptly lost ten percent of its revenue from its total international
operations that year. In the case of the U.S., the potential for loss
is all the more greater considering that apart from the voluminous
passenger traffic, the value of air freight between the two
countries is expected to increase roughly fifty-five percent from
$1.1 billion to $1.7 billion in the next five years. 58 As in the
Japanese case, success depends on U.S. resourcefulness and its
ability to reach a delicate compromise within a trilateral political
framework. The difference is that the roles of Peking and Taipei
would be switched, and more ROC ego and emotions would be
involved. In either case, however, problems in coming to terms
with both sides will reach beyond the realm of politics and law.
For the PRC, this is partly attributable to the fact that as a
socialist planned economy and a late-comer to commercial
aviation, it has a very different infrastructure and concept of
regulatory economics in international air transport from that of
the U.S.
V.

Conflict and Compromise
DIVERGENT APPROACHES

Because air transportation in the People's Republic has a
small market, and is owned and monopolized by the state,
competition in the private enterprise sense simply does not exist. 5 9
Conversely, as it is also neither experienced nor equipped to
compete with major Western countries in the contemporary airline
57. See Central Daily News (Taipei), June 6, 1973, April 17, 1974. The Civil
Aviation Administration of Taiwan is responsible for air navigation services
within the Taipei Flight Information Region (TFIR). Established initially through
the Chicago Annexes and ICAO, TFIR covers an air space of 176,000 sq. nautical
mls. At present it includes 14 airways.
58. George Zettler, Vice-President (Sales) of Flying Tiger Line (August 1978)
(Joint Economic Meeting of the U.S. and the ROC).
59. As between regional bureaus, however, there could be competition in
meeting the state plan.
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market, the PRC adopts a "protectionist" as opposed to a "laissez
faire" approach abroad in which the state maintains a tight
control over traffic rights, capacity and tariff. 60 In fact, as many
as twenty-three of the thirty-plus civil air transport agreements
entered into by the PRC are characterized by provisions for
predetermination of capacity and government supervision of
tariff. 61 The Chinese obviously believe that state participation in
planning and decision-making in these respects, and close
cooperation between the two parties to the agreement can equalize
disparate competitive bargaining power and avoid otherwise risky
airline initiated experimentations, thereby guaranteeing a fair
and constant return from the designated air routes.
On the other hand, with a well-developed market at home and
overseas, the U.S. is free enterprise and consumer-oriented, and
generally favors a competitive environment for air transport. 62
The traditional American philosophy is that airline competition is
healthy since it increases efficiency and lowers costs. The end
product is, therefore, cheaper rates and better service for the
public, and improved safety and technical benefits for air travel
as a whole. Also, the Americans favor an accident compensation
limit which is many times higher than that set forth in the
Warsaw Convention (1929) as amended by the Hague Protocol
(1955) to which the Chinese adhere.6 3 In the face of these
fundamental differences, U.S. attempts in reaching a mutually
acceptable agreement can only lead to a conflict. The American
task is made even more difficult by the precedent which was set
by its agreement with the Russians in 1966, and with the British
(better known as Bermuda II) less than a year ago. Like the PRC,
neither the Soviet Union nor the United Kingdom believe in a
liberal policy in bilateral air commerce.
U.S.-SOVIET AGREEMENT

(1966)

AND BERMUDA

II (1977)

Although the two agreements are a decade apart from each
other, they are similar in nature and relevant in this context
60. Typically, the General Administration of Civil Aviation negotiates directly
with the foreign airline. Capacity and tariff provision are subject to its final
approval.
61. That is solely because only the contents of these twenty-three agreements
have been unearthed and studied. It may be assumed that the remaining ones do
not deviate from the pattern.
62. Lissitzyn, Bilateral Agreements on Air Transport, 30 J. AIR L. & CoM. 248
(1964).
63. See ICAO Doc. 9154- LC/174-4, at 7 (1977).
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because the U.S. in both instances adopted a basically "restrictive" approach to international air transport. 64 At one level, this
furnished an example of the kind of consensus which may be
achieved between systems which pursue differing aviation
policies. At another level, however, it also opens up the Pandora's
Box in U.S. aviation negotiations with not only the People's
Republic, but with such countries as Japan and Italy as well.
Having previously agreed to predetermination of frequencies and
limitation of fifth freedom rights with the Soviet and United
Kingdom, the U.S. cannot lightly refuse the same concession to
the People's Republic lest it be accused of discrimination. 55 But if
the U.S. makes another exception for the PRC, it will be
constrained to either doing the same or making economically
detrimental route concessions as a substitute in its present
negotiations with Japan and Italy.
In either case, the choice will be a very difficult one. Should
the U.S. agree to a repeat performance for the PRC it will run
afoul of the Administration's rationalization of the Soviet and
British agreements as "special cases." 66 Moreover, without
seeking adequate concessions from Peking, opening up the China
air route can be considered by some as being counter-productive in
balance-of-payment terms. Indeed, it was concern for this "giveaway" attitude which prompted then President Nixon a .few years
ago to warn in the Statement of International Air Transportation
Policy that" ... caution must be exercised in granting routes on
which the traffic potential is limited. . . ." Echoing a similar
concern for the imbalance of traffic on some international routes,
the CAB has also cautioned that the U.S. should " ... trade as
equals, not as the dominant giant and the less well-off countries.
After a while, our generosity catches up with us . . ." 67
Assuming that an agreeable arrangement with the PRC is
ultimately reached, an additional problem still exists. Economic
realism dictates that the U.S. secure "beyond rights" from
64. Air Transport Agreement, November 4, 1966, U.S.-U.S.S.R., T.I.A.S. No.
6135 as amended. T.I.A.S. Nos. 6560, 7658, 8058. Air Transport Agreement. July 23,
1977, U.S.-U.K., (Bermuda II), 2 AIR L. 194 (1977).
65. High level U.S. officials have made known that they will not adopt
Bermuda II in future negotiations, see Aviation Daily, October 3, 1977. The Soviets
have also created many problems after the bilateral air agreement was put into
effect. Among other things, the U.S. has accused Aeroflot of engaging in deceptive
practices. See Order 76-1o-79 issued on October 19, 1976 (Docket 29944).
66. Possibly, an exception was also made in the agreement with India.
67. 36 J. AIR L. & CoM. 651 (1970).
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gateway cities of Tokyo and Hong Kong ahead of time. 68 If not,
then, like the case of Canada, air traffic rights to China will
remain a dead letter. Meanwhile, in seeking these "beyond
rights," the U.S. would be put in an unenviable bargaining
position with Japan and the U.K. Possibly, route concessions may
have to be made in both cases.
VI. Some Afterthoughts
Thus far, an attempt has been made to analyze the legal
technicalities and problems of commercial aviation within the
U.S.-PRC-ROC framework. Although some conclusions have been
reached in support of simultaneous services to both the Chinese
Mainland and Taiwan, they nevertheless merely represent an
optimism which can easily be shattered amidst the vicissitudes in
U.S.-PRC relations, and recurring problems within the People's
Republic itself. Unfortunately, because of the novelty of the trilateral relationship, and its lack of effective sanction, international law cannot be outcome determinative in this case. Rather,
the solution to the trilateral problem and its viability depend to a
large extent upon the resourcefulness and decision-making power
stemming from one person, namely the American president. In
this respect, therefore, the situation is unique.
From a practical point of view, though, the problems and
solutions explored in the context will serve as a meaningful
reference for other countries and airlines contemplating capitalizing on the current "China craze." While their enthusiasm may yet
lead to the emergence of a new international air route structure,
they will no doubt find, as Marco Polo did years ago, that the road
to China is a much more difficult one than one would anticipate.
In the long run, since the PRC air route is not likely to be
profitable in the foreseeable future, a foreign airline may be
constrained to make a realistic choice between "pride" on the one
hand and "purse" on the other.
By virtue of an agreement with the U.S., the PRC will be
moving further along in its integration with the existing norms in
international air transport. In terms of the development of its air
routes abroad, CAAC will be able to activate "beyond rights"

68. But even if the U.S. obtains "beyond rights" from Tokyo and Hong Kong
from the PRC, it must still be agreed to by Japan and Hong Kong. If not, then, like
Canada, it may choose not to operate at all for economic reasons, despite an
agreement with the PRC.
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obtained from Japan and Canada to the U.S. and beyond to Latin
America. 69 Additionally, the relatively inexperienced Chinese will
benefit from aviation-related legal and technical interface with
their American counterpart. The outcome, of course, will be
supportive of Peking's present pragmatic foreign policy, and its
recent decision to open its doors to visitors from overseas.
As far as Taiwan is concerned, ever since the PRC Japan air
agreement came into being, it has reluctantly but quietly accepted
the "Japan formula" as the means in preserving aviation
relations with derecognizing states. This study has suggested an
alternative to that approach; that is, given some form of
independent international legal existence, Taiwan can, at the very
least, benefit from the Chicago Convention although it is not a
party to the treaty itself. 70 Since this has the effect of placing its
aviation relations on a state-to-state level, it would seem a better
option for Taiwan in future similar situations than the "Japan
formula" which can always remain its very last resort.
Certain questions about the PRC, however, remain unanswered. An especially pertinent one is whether or not it has, or is
able to produce the necessary technology and equipment to
sustain CAAC's growth and its ambitious development schedules
at home and abroad. 71 Also, can China's burgeoning tourism
industry thrive by "walking on two legs" without seeking foreign
expert help? If not, will the Chinese on the Mainland import it

69. Annex, Article I, Civil Air Transport Agreement, June 11, 1973, CanadaP.R.C., ICAO No. 2400; Annex, Article I, Civil Air Transport Agreement, April 20,
1974, Japan-P.R.C., reproduced in 19 JAPANESE ANNALS OF INT'L L. 245 (1975).
70. As a state, Taiwan in theory may ratify the Chicago Convention and join
ICAO.
71. There are varying estimates on China's civil air fleet. The most recent one
was made by Bohdan Szuprowicz of 21st Century Research. See Szuprowicz,
China's Airline Program Still Modest, But Growing, AIR TRANSPORT WoRLD 38-42
(May 1978). Out of the approximate total of 600 aircraft in his estimation, 287 are
Soviet-made. An earlier figure was made available by Hans Heymann Jr., then of
Rand Corporation. According to him, the total number of civil aircraft acquired
and ordered was 500 by September, 1974. Among them, 390 are Soviet models. A
1971 estimate provided by intelligence sources in Taiwan was a total of 340. The
conclusion based on these figures is that between 7tr80% of the Chinese civil air
fleet are Soviet-built, piston-driven or turboprop fu.rcraft. Within the air fleet, also,
only 15 have a range beyond 3,500 miles. At present, the aircraft factories in
Shenyang, Chungking and Harbin, and the design and development centers there
and in Peking, are still not meeting the nation's demand. Moreover, it is estimated
that China will have to upgrade up to 50 airports to develop a modern air system.
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from the U.S.? Granted that they will, what then will be the mode
of technology transfer? Are there constraints on their choices? If
so, what could be the inhibiting factors?
At first sight, one must concede that, individually, they present some very difficult questions. Nevertheless, taken together
and upon further reflection, a common discernible premise or
pattern among them readily emerges. Underlying all these
questions is the basic tenet and problem that People's China
as well as its civil aviation are going through a transition. Most
importantly, whether it be a society or an industry, when it is
involved in such transformation from a traditional era toward
modernity, there will normally be impediments to constructive
changes. In this regard, the PRC and its civil air transport
industry are no exception.
Generally speaking, in aviation, apart from the demand for
better management concepts and personnel, the need is vital to
maintain a modern fleet of aircraft and high technical standards
in flying, maintenance, overhaul and inspection, as well as
navigation and communications. In the PRC's case, however, it
goes even beyond that. As its representative rightly pointed out in
a recent ICAO meeting, the problems it confronts and shared by
the developing countries are different from those which developed
countries now face.
. . . For example, while the development of a new type of
aircraft and the advent of a new generation of air transport
would provide new orders for the manufacturing states, to
China and the developing nations it would mean having to
go into re-equipment before the life-span of their present air
fleet expired. On top of that, there are problems of financing
and spare parts acquisition for these foreign-made aircrafts.
Needless to say, the Chinese on the mainland are cognizant of
their needs and the importance of modernization. They certainly
would like to be able to develop an independent and viable aircraft
industry, and to build their domestic and international airline on
their own. It is only that, at this time, they lack the ways and
means to accomplish these objectives. 72 What is more, the People's
Republic is fearful and uncertain of the price it may have to pay to
· 72. Heymann, for instance, suggests that the Chinese are at least 20 years
behind the West in aircraft technology. See supra note 41.
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keep in step with progress. To a large extent, as impediments to
growth, this fear and uncertainty is attributable to China's
experience with foreign involvement in its civil aviation development both before and after 1949. 73 To be able to properly appraise
the present Chinese aviation market, it is absolutely necessary to
trace and closely examine those developmental experiences. With
better understanding of their current implications and significance to the Chinese, interested U.S. airlines and aircraft
manufacturers can develop the proper strategy, and avoid many
of the illusions and pitfalls here and now, thereby improving their
chances of successful dealings with the PRC.
Two additional comments, however, need be made about this
second portion of the study. First, as previously mentioned,
historical considerations are in order. Marking the change of
government on the Chinese Mainland, the year 1949 will serve as
the dividing line in our chronology and concentration. In
discussing the pre-1949 period, the focus will be on local aviation
joint ventures with the U.S. Although there were similar
undertakings with other countries during that time, none lasted as
long, cost as much and became so entangled with Chinese civil
aviation as the Americans. The latter, of course, also made the
most impact on the industry. As the discussion shifts to the period
after the Communist takeover, however, the emphasis is on the
Soviet Union. To the extent that it was the only nation that ever
becam~ involved with air transport growth in the People's
Republic at that point in time, its experience will be extremely
relevant to the present analysis.
Second, in assessing the business outlook for U.S. airlines and
aircraft manufacturers in the PRC, no effort has been made to
examine the legal problems inherent in further normalization of
bilateral trade and economic relations. It is presumed that, in
time, presidential action and legislative changes will overcome the
existing obstacles. Instead, toward the end, this study concen-

73. The only English language studies available on the subject are WILLIAM
LEARY JR., THE DRAGON's WINGS - THE CHINA NATIONAL AviATION CoRPORATror.; AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF COMMERCIAL AVIATION IN CHINA (1976) and his
unpublished manuscript, The China National Aviatwn Corporation. Unfortunately Leary did not use any Chinese sources. One of the best Chinese accounts is
K'AI-CHIEH WANG, wo-kuo min-yung hang-k'ung shih-yeh fa-chan chien-she, (A
CoNCISE HISTORY OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF CIVIL AVIATION ENTERPRISES I:-.1 OUR
CouNTRY) (Taiwan, ROC: China Society of Communications and Construction,
1955).
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trates on the areas of possibility in civil aviation, and the means
of realizing that possibility. In particular, it probes the feasibility
of joint venture, licensing and service contracts within that
setting.
As used throughout this study, the term "joint venture"
includes various cooperative arrangements and is not necessarily
limited to equity joint ventures.
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PART Two

THE PRC MARKET- PROBLEMS AND PERSPECTIVES
FOR THE U.S. CIVIL AVIATION INDUSTRY
... The U.S.A. and reactionaries of certain other countries
do not let us progress, do not let us become powerful . . . we
are filled with anger . . . But let them wait eight or ten years
or a little longer, and then they will see what China is ...
People's Daily, Peking
August 13, 1960
I. American Pioneers- The Tu!bulent Years (1928-1948)
THE CASE OF THE CHINA NATIONAL AVIATION Corporation
(CNAC)
In the early twenties, Charles Lindbergh's historic flight had
not only tickled the fancy of many people, it had created
considerable impact on aircraft production and, in turn, the stock
markets on Wall Street. Consequently, U.S. investment speculators
began to take great interest in aviation-related market opportunities
abroad. Prospects were investigated in Cuba, Peru and Turkey. 74 It
did not take long for an affiliate of Curtiss-Wright to notice the vast
possibilities that the field of air transport offered in China.
Encouraged by the Chinese and the American government, the
company- Aviation Exploration Inc.- decided to investigate the
potentials seriously. Their efforts were well rewarded, for in 1929
they came to agreement with a government-sponsored aviation
corporation in China. 75 Thus far, the path to the East had been
smooth. As it were, the Americans became the first foreigners to help
the Chinese develop their commercial airlines.
Initially the parties resolved to enter into two contracts. The
first was an unprecedented mail contract over certain exclusively
franchised routes in China. In return for air and ground support
services furnished on these designated routes, Aviation

74. LEARY, THE CNAC, supra note 73, at 6. Soon, as in China's case, Pan Am
and Lufthansa were competing against one another to gain a foothold in Latin
America. Burden, Struggle for Airways in Latin America, (New York: Council on
Foreign Relations, 1943).
75. The first two agreements were originally published in 13 CHINA SociAL
A:>~D PoLITICAL SciENCE REVIEW 81-91 (Public Docts. 1929). The third contract is
found in Arthur M. Young Papers, Hoover Institution. Young was financial
advisor to the Chinese government during the critical years 1929-47. He also
served as Director of CNAC.
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Exploration, and later its successor China Airways Federal, was to
be paid by a combination of postal receipts and promissory notes at
a per-mile rate based on a sliding scale and a minimum guarantee of
3,000 miles per day. 76 The other contract granted the U.S. corporation the right to establish and operate flying schools, and the
privilege of "engaging in all usual branches of the commercial
aviation industry, including the purchase or sale or repair of
airplanes ... " 77 It is interesting to note that even though both
contracts had been signed in 1929, they each had a Chinese and
English version, and displayed comprehensive draftmenship and
features comparable to the contracts of today. For instance, there
were clear provisions regarding legal liability, taxation, arbitration
and assignment of contract.
Three months later, in order to obtain frnancial support for the
construction of airports necessary for the contemplated air services,
Aviation Exploration also agreed under a third contract to loan the
Chinese company U.S. $1 million in gold coins at an interest rate of
six percent per annum payable semiannually. 7B No joint venture
had existed at this point. However, the scenerio changed the
following year as the Chinese corporation underwent complete
reorganization.
Under a Sino-U.S. joint venture agreement in 1930, a new
company named China National Aviation Corporation (CNAC)
was formed in China with an authorized capital of approximately
U.S.$3 million divided into 10,000 shares at U. S. $300 par value
each. The new contract called for the dissolution of the previous
contract, and a consolidation of all the assets and liabilities of the
Chinese and the American company in China into the new venture
CNAC. This time, for a forty-five percent ownership of CNAC, the
U.S. partner delivered U.S. $25,000 in cash, in addition to other
equipment and assets it turned over at book value. 79
As to be expected, even with their majority interests, the
Chinese were anxious to control the company. Under the agreement

76. Air Mail Contract Between CNAC and Aviation Exploration, Inc., Articles
4, 10, 12, 20, China Social ... , supra, note 75, at 85-89.
77. Contract between CNAC and Aviation Exploration, Inc. for Establishment
and Operation of Flying School, Factories and Aerial Transportation, Article 1. Id.
81.

78. The Six Percent Gold Loan Agreement, Article I, Section 2, and promissory
note as part of contract, Young Papers.
79. Young Papers, Contract between Ministry of Communications, ROC and
China Airways Federal, Inc., U.S.A., Articles II, IX.
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the Chinese could appoint four out of seven members of a Board of
Directors responsible for the management of the jointly-owned
corporation. It was also agreed that the highest executive officers,
namely the president and one vice-president of CNAC, were to be
selected by theN ationalists Chinese government. In the same spirit,
two of the operating divisions- Business and Finance- of the new
airline were to be headed by Chinese citizens with American
assistants. 80 Although the American share of ownership of CNAC
passed to Pan Am three years later, the above predominantly
Chinese arrangement remained substantially the same until1945.
By that time CNAC was operating eight routes and carrying some
40,000 passengers - 180 times the total fifteen years ago. In that
year Pan Am sold its CNAC shares back to the Chinese government,
and entered into a new agreement with the Chinese for setting up a
new CNAC in which it acquired only a twenty percent ownership. 81
In spite of the many organizational changes in the Sino-U.S. airline
venture, American interests persisted right up to the lastdaysofthe
Nationalist rule on the Mainland. While there were similar
cooperative arrangements with Germany (Lufthansa) and the
Soviet Union before 1949, they could not match CNAC in terms of
the extent of their activities and involvement in the development of
civil aviation in China.sz
AIRCRAFT MANUFACTURING

Prior to the Communist takeover of China, U.S. capital and
management participation also prevailed among the local aircraft
80. ld., Article III; see also LEARY, DRAGON's WINGS, Ch. 2., supra, note 73.
81. Young Papers, Contract between Ministry of Communications, ROC and
Pan American Airways Corporation, Article II.
82. As early as 1928, Lufthansa had approached China about opening up the
Europe-Asia route. Two years later, the two parties agreed to come to agreement,
and the Germans obtained a one-third interest in the resulting joint airline venture
Eurasia Aviation corporation. An English translation of the contract was found in
Young's Papers. Regarding Eurasia generally, see Chen, Aviation in China,
Information Bulletin 272-73 (Nanking, China: GIO, 1937); Wang, supra note 73.
Eurasia operated within China only. With the advent and consequent problems of
the Sino-Japanese War (1937-45), China also formed a joint airline with the Soviet
Union. The airline Hami-Ata came into existence in 1939, and operated erratically
in northern China transporting largely military supplies. The only available
account is in Chinese; see Ling, Chung-su hang-k'ung kung-ssu shi-mo, (The
Beginning and End of the Sino-Soviet Airline), (Taiwan: Research Institute of
Communications, 1962). With the occupation of north eastern China by the
Japanese during their aggression, a joint venture airline called Hui-tung was
formed. Very little is known about this undertaking.
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and parts manufacturing industry. Even though as early as 1920
China had produced its own glider trainer, aircraft manufacturing
on any noticeable scale was lacking owing to the apathy of the
investment public, insufficient government encouragement and
training facilities, as well as a general scarcity of indigenous
aeronautical technology and aircraft parts. 83 By 1937 however,
there were at least three joint ventures in aircraft manufacturing in
China, two of which were co-owned by U.S. partners. The major
Chinese-American aircraft factory operated in Hangchow under a
five year agreement with renewable options. It was producing body
framework for some sixty aeroplanes every year. Here,
notwithstanding that it had been mutually agreed that the Chinese
would be running the entire management and production in the long
run, all business, finance and operational functions were headed by
the American counterpart for a number of years. 84
For their earlier triumph with the joint airline venture CNAC,
Curtiss-Wright of the U.S. was given the permission to help build the
second aircraft factory in China. It was located in Canton and had a
manufacturing capacity of four airplane body frameworks per
month. The third and only other compatible foreign investment in
this industry came from the Italians. In addition to their
·contribution in military aviation, the latter were successful in
persuading the Chinese to set up, under joint capital, an aircraft
factory in the South. By 1937, this factory was turning out ten
aircraft in a month. ss
A MIXED BLESSING?
So far history speaks for itself. American investments indeed
played a dominant and meaningful role in the development of civil
aviation in pre-1949 China. From their U.S. airline partner Pan Am,
the Chinese were able to reap the benefit of strong financial support,
valuable experience, better and more efficient operating procedures
and management concepts. Without the skills, dedication and
preserverance of some of the flight and ground personnel furnished
by the American co-owners, life sustaining air operations for most
parts of China during the Japanese attack would have suffered a
83. Liang, Chung-kuo hang-k'ung kung-yeh ti' chan-wan, (Outlook of China's
Aircraft Industry), 31 TuNG-FANG TsA-CHIH 27-32 (EASTERN MAGAZINE) (1934).
84. Wu, Tsai Ti-kuo chu-i ya-p'o hsia ti chiu Chung-kuo hang-k'ung, (Former
Chinese Aviation Under Imperialism Oppression), 4 HANG-K'UNG CHIH-SHE 16-17
(Aviation Knowledge) (1964).
85. The China Annual - 1943, at 369-70 (Shanghai: Asia Statistics Co., 1944).
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complete breakdown. Similarly, had it not been for the technology,
capital and entrepreneurship of its U.S. counterpart, China could
not have singularly afforded any aircraft and parts manufacturing
facilities. 86 Yet it would be presumptious to measure the success or
failure of these joint ventures and their relevance to China today by
these facts alone. While China and its foreign partners were
obviously motivated and bound together by mutual self-interest in
these undertakings, there were many misgivings on both parts. To
the extent that these misgivings represent perspectives of business
partners with very different economic, socio-political and historical
backgrounds, they demonstrate the propensity of recurrence, and
the need for changes and compromises today and in the future. For
this reason, and in attempting an objective appraisal of the aviation
joint ventures, these misgivings must be carefully analyzed.
On the Chinese side, the basic problem had been the strong antiforeign sentiments among both official and civilian circles since the
late Ch'ing period. While the usefulness of air transportation was
not disputed, the public, and even those who advocated import of
foreign technology into China for the purpose of modernizing the
economy still carried fresh and vivid memories of the humiliation
the country had suffered under foreign economic domination. The
concession of extraterritoriality, the most favored nation treatment
and the loss of inland navigation rights were painful thoughts
which continued to haunt the Chinese mind. That as a practical
necessity the country had to rely on foreign capital, technology and
management in the development of the aviation industry was a fact
that many Chinese found difficult to accept. The result was to put
the joint aviation ventures in a very unfavorable operating
environment from the very start.
Fear of foreign domination might have been eliminated or
minimized through the assurance of an overwhelming Chinese
interest in each joint undertaking. With this in mind, the Chinese
in the beginning had insisted on, and succeeded in obtaining a
fifty-fifty percent majority in their contract with the Americans.
When the Sino-U.S. agreement establishing a joint airline was
announced in 1930, it was warmly received by the local press and
was acclaimed as one of the significant achievements of the
86. YOUNG, CHINA AND THE HELPING HAND 1937-1945, at 52-54 (1963);
LEARY, DRAGON's WINGS, Chapter 4, supra note 73. In fact, since 1933, Pan Am
had given CNAC the full use and benefit of its Purchasing Department in the U.S.
Equipment orders were made by CNAC without requirement for down payment,
and savings ranged from 1o-40%. CNAC Memo, Pan Am Record!!, at 2-3.

40

CoNTEMPORARY AsiAN STUDIES SERIES

Nationalists government. 87 Unfortunately, the guarantee of
Chinese control under these majority equity interest arrangements proved to be more apparent than real as foreign partners
remained in charge of operations. So long as the latter continued
to supervise services, they were in a position to retain effective
control over the sole marketable product of the airline, and thus
its revenue. The "Chinese majority" rule as a model for future
emulation also turned out to be short-lived. In the late thirties,
when the Nationalists Chinese government reached agreement
with the Soviets in opening a joint airline, they were compelled by
pressing circumstances to concede to equal ownership by both
parties. This became a new precedent which survived despite the
change of government in 1949.88
The other major Chinese complaint was that the foreign
partners had not made sufficient efforts to train local pilots and
ground personnel as they had originally promised. 89 In addition,
there was proven discrimination in the payment of wages to
qualified Chinese flight personnel. 90 Discontent also existed in
joint ventures in aircraft manufacturing. In this field, the
acknowledged goal was ultimate self-sufficiency; yet in the years
to come the Chinese were unable to break away from complete
dependence on their foreign partner for know-how, designs and
aircraft parts. In 1936, while its purchases of aero-engine parts
and products from the U.S. totaled $6.9 million, China was also
simultaneously importing a substantial number of aircraft from
other nations. 91 That being the case, what did the jointly-owned
and operated aircraft factories in China accomplish?
Evidence shows that at the initial stage, a typical joint
aircraft production venture would be engaged exclusively in the
importation of parts and construction of simple aircraft body
frameworks. The factory would only enter into aircraft production
at a much later stage; and even when it did, it would merely
manufacture "second rate" aircraft of foreign design. Input from
the host country in all areas except labor was actually very
87. Meng, Development of Airways in the Middle Kpngdom, THE CHINA
August 6, 1932, at 353-54.
88. The post-1949 Sino-Soviet airline SKOGA was equally owned by both
sides.
89. Young, CHINA NATION-BUILDING, p. 324.
90. LEARY, DRAGON'S WINGS, supra note 73 at 198-200.
91. Kwong, China's Aviation Needs, 2 CHINA QuARTERLY 333-40, 339
(1936-1937).
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limited. Consequently, China's early hopes of self-reliance and
ultimate aircraft production with home-made parts and designs
never got off the ground. In reality, joint ventures in aircraft
manufacturing had defeated the very purpose of their existence. 92
AMERICAN FRUSTRATION

The Americans, too, had many bones of contention. To begin
with, it was quite plain from the joint venture agreement
establishing CNAC and subsequent events that they would supply
· aircraft, personnel and cash funds whereas the Chinese would
only pledge their credit and moral support. While this seemed an
unfair and somewhat high price for the Americans to pay, the
promissory notes and bonds guaranteed by the Chinese were in
fact not worth the papers they were printed on. Most importantly,
the joint enterprise did not turn out to be as profitable, or as
promising, as the foreign investors had envisaged. Insofar as
CNAC was concerned, in 1933 it was on the verge of total collapse.
At that point, because of the apparent bleak future of the airline,
and the economic crisis in the U.S., the American partner was no
longer willing to put more capital into the venture as they were
expected to. Their anxiety to withdraw their involvement
completely was only saved by Pan Am's decision to acquire their
interests in China. With the change in American ownership, the
Sino-U.S. venture was finally able to yield its first profit in mid1935. Although in the later years revenue continued to improve in
general, war conditions, skyrocketing operating costs, fluctuating
exchange rates and depreciation of Nationalist currency never
ceased to plague the airline financially. 93
American frustration did not stop short at financial setbacks.
Unaware and unprepared at first, the foreign partners and the
joint ventures soon found themselves entangled in the intricate
web of Chinese politics. Specifically, the problem was two-fold.
First of all, as a brand new mode of transport, CNAC immediately
became a subject of jurisdictional dispute between the Ministries
of Communications and Railroads, respectively, in China.
Because the Minister of Railroads, Sun Fo (who, incidentally, was
the son of Dr. Sun Yat-sen) initiated and concluded the original
92. The Communist Chinese are especially critical of the Nationalists in this
regard. See Chiang, Ssu-shih nien ti hsin-hsiao, k'ung-chi ho ya-p'o. (Forty Years
of Torture, Attack and Oppression), 3 HANG·K'UNG CHIH-SHE 23-25 (AVIATION
KNOWLEDGE) (February 1960).
93. LEARY, DRAGON's WINGS, supra note 73, at 205-12.
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contract with Aviation Exploration, the Ministry of
Communications took offence and retaliated by refusing landing
permission to CNAC aircraft at all civilian airports. In the long
run, the American investors had to make the "Six Percent Gold
Loan" to Sun Fo's office to enable him to construct airports for
CNAC aircraft landing. Despite instructions from the State
Council, the Minister of Communications declined to honor the
contract and refused to make disbursements to the U.S. partner
from the postal receipts. When disbursements were finally made
by the Chinese, they were in the form of unsecured promissory
notes. Putting aside the politics involved here, this will serve as a
good illustration of the extent to which China had relied on heavy
borrowing in its business ventures during the pre-1949 period. 94
The second aspect of the problem may be attributable to the
continuous struggle for political power in early twentieth century
China. Although China was officially unified as a country in
mid-1928, the Nationalists government in Nanking did not enjoy
the full support of the factional and regional leaders. More than
once, warlord rivalry prevented the extension of air services into
areas outside de facto central control. In addition, because of the
combat potentials of civil air transport, there had been repeated
attempts by the Military to gain control of the airlines. All this
only made the task of running an airline in China more
cumbersome than it already was. 95

II.

The Lost Years (1949-1972)
With the advent of the People's Republic, U.S.-China political
and economic relations came to a standstill for more than two
decades. In the meantime, American capital investments in
aviation quickly and totally disappeared from the Chinese scene.
That, however, did not absolve the new government on the
Mainland from alien involvement in the civil air transport sector.
Although foreigners still played a decisive role in the next decade,
the scenario was no longer one of nations scrambling for
concessions, or spheres of influence. Of course, fortunate for the
new regime, there was also no foreign aggression. As a sharp
contrast to preceding decades, however, only one world power

94. YOUNG, HELPING HAND, supra note 73, at 45-48.
95. For an illuminating account on provincial warlordism during this period,
see BARNET!', CHINA ON THE EVE OF COMMUNIST TAKEOVER 57-80 (1963); LEARY,
DRAGON'S WINGS, supra note 73, at 113, 179.
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became politically and economically involved with China. It was
from this source alone that the Chinese aviation industry derived
its sustenance and strength. This early one-sided foreign
investment and procurement strategy of the PRC was to create
far-reaching consequences in its subsquent policy of aviation
technology import.
THE SOVIET MISMATCH

On the eve of the Mainland takeover, the PRC inherited a
crisis-striken civil air transport industry. The aftermath of the
war of resistance against the Japanese, and the ensuing civil war
had left few aircraft or parts which might be of practical value to
the new government. While most of the airfields and navigational
aids had been destroyed or severely damaged, there was a general
lack of aviation fuel, trained pilots and technicians. To aggravate
this problem, the Communist Chinese were unsuccessful in a legal
battle to regain ownership of over seventy airplanes belonging to
CNAC and CATC in Hong Kong. 96 As air transportation was
extremely vital to national economic and defense interest at this
time, the new leadership was therefore forced to confront a serious
problem not dissimilar to one which their predecessor had to face
in 1929. Basically it was a dilemma of choice. Rather than just a
question of whether or not to invite foreign capital and technology
into China in such times of need, it was an ideological choice of
whether or not condemned history should be allowed to repeat
itself. 97
Since the PRC had then adopted a bipolar view of world
politics, its political and economic options were limited. Apart
from the ideological affinity, the Soviet Union was in fact the one
and only nation willing and eager to lend the new leadership in
China a helping hand. As to be expected, the latter was hardly in
a position to refuse the offer. Subsequent to the signing of the

96. The case ultimately went on final appeal to the Privy Council (Highest
appeal court for the British colony) in 1952, and was decided against PRC interest.
See Civil Air Transport Incorporated v. Central Air Transport, Corp. 2 All E.R. 733
(1952). This prompted a rare, but interesting scholarly legal rebuttal from the PRC.
Li, Legal Questions Arising from Hong Kong's Detention of Airplanes Belonging
to China National Aviation Corporation and the Central Air Transport, 2 HsiN
CHIEN·SHE 2-6 (NEW CONSTRUCTION). (No. 10).
97. For an analysis of the economic and political problems the PRC faced at
that time, see BARNETT, CoMMUNIST CHINA: THE EARLY YEARS, 1949-55 (1964);
FITZGERALD. THE CHINESE VIEW OF THEIR PLACE IN THE WORLD 38-57 (1964).
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Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Military
Assistance (1950), the two nations immediately came to terms on
various form of Soviet assistance. 98 Among them was a ten year
agreement which provided for the establishment of a jointlyowned and operated airline in China. In reality, the Sino-Soviet
airline became the first and last of any form of joint venture in
civil aviation in which the new Chinese government ever
participated. For this significant reason, and especially for the
purpose of evaluating future prospects in this area, it is necessary
to take a closer look at the agreement which gave rise to this
airline. 99
According to a Joint Communique issued by the two
countries,
Sovetsko-Kitaysko Aksionernoe Obshestvo
Grazhdanskoi Aviatsii (SKOGA) - the Sino-Soviet Joint Stock
Airline - was organized to ". . . help develop civil aviation in
China, and to strengthen Chinese Russian economic cooperation
..." Because of the partners' mutual reverance for national
sovereignty, it was decided that the airline should comply with
"laws pertaining to business enterprise and revenue income ofthe
Chinese government." Based on the principle of equality, the
parties were to have equal shares, and even sharing of company
profits and expenditures. As part of their investment, the Chinese
undertook to provide SKOGA with the land, factories, housing
and building materials for any other constructions. The Russian
invested capital comprised of various mechanical installations, as
well as industrial, surveying and aeronautical equipment,
including aircraft. Not unlike joint airline ventures in the
Republican period, the agreement also provided for the training of
Chinese technical and administrative personnel. Pursuant to
Article 14 of the agreement, the airline could open schools and
courses or send Chinese citizens to be trained in the Soviet
Union. 100

98. WEI, CHINA AND SoviET RussiA, chapter 264-80 (1956).
99. Joint ventures were established on March 21, 1950 for petroleum
production, rare metals and civil aviation. As with others, the contents of the joint
airline SKOGA was never disclosed publicly. Present analysis has been based on
information from the Chinese news media and Soviet Press Translations. It is
clear that most of the joint ventures shared very similar features.
100. Joint Sino-Soviet Communique, NCNA (Peking), April 1, 1950; Welcome
Sino-Soviet Economic Cooperation Beneficial to China's Economy Construction,
HSIN·HUA YuEH·PAO, (NEw CHINA MoNTHLY), May 15, 1950, at 135-37.
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While management authority was vested in the
Administrative Committee, the two partners had agreed that the
Chinese representative would appoint the President and Assistant
General Manager of SKOGA for the initial term and to serve on a
two year rotational basis. This meant that although the Russians
would initially fill the positions of Vice-President and General
Manager, at the end of the first two year term, they would replace
the Chinese in their positions and vice-versa. Clearly, this represented an important deviation from previously established practices.
During the first eighteen months of its operation, SKOGA did
not receive much attention from the Chinese press. But by the end
of that time, an administrative office and nineteen field offices
had been set up. In November 1952, it was reported that the SinoSoviet airline had been successfully serving Chita, Irkutsk and
Alma Ata from Peking. Samples of China's products, precision
instrument and machinery ordered from abroad by the Chinese
were being sent via SKOGA. Hailed as an "advanced Socialist
civil aviation transport enterprise" with an unblemished flight
safety record, the Sino-Soviet airline had, during its four years of
existence, completed ". . . 13,500,000 kilometer-tons, carried
several tens of thousands passengers over 1,600 tons of mail, and
4,700 tons of freight." 101 By 1954, there was little doubt that
SKOGA had assumed a vital role in the economic development of
the PRC.
As the economy was slowly rehabilitated and the Chinese had
become better trained and equipped to direct the activities of the
various joint business enterprises, the PRC and Soviet Union
decided that the time was ripe for reassessment and change.
Toward the end of 1954, the Soviets finally agreed that they would
transfer their shares in four joint stock companies back to the
Chinese. 102 Since SKOGA was among four companies selected to
undergo the ownership change, a six member "Transfer Work
Committee" was formed to organize and facilitate the winding up
process and transfer of assets. Before the year expired, the
Russian share of the assets and securities in SKOGA had been
turned over, and the Chinese were thus able to integrate all

101. Big Increases in Freight on Three Airlines Between China and Russia,
NCNA (Peking), Sino-Soviet Civil Aviation Company Marks 4th Anniversary, Jenmin Jih-pao (People's daily), July 4, 1954.
102. NCNA. (Peking), October 12, 1954.
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existing routes and services into one state-owned airline called
CAAC. Far more important, the complete transfer of Soviet
interests in SKOGA marked the end of foreign capital and control
in Chinese civil aviation.
AN AFFAIR To REMEMBER
Looking back, in one respect, China's experience with SKOGA
was relatively more beneficial than that with CNAC twenty years
ago. Unlike CNAC, the foreign partner in this case could not be
criticized for their part in the training of local personnel.
Although at the outset Soviet comrades outnumbered their
Chinese counterpart in several technical departments, at the
fourth anniversary of the airline the latter had become three times
the number of the former. By then Soviet experts had not only put
together twenty-four special training courses for the Chinese staff
of SKOGA, they had also furnished it with Li-2, Il-2 and Il-14
transports, maintenance equipment and spare parts. During this
period, many volumes of Soviet civil aviation rules and
regulations, as well as related documents, were translated into the
Chinese language.l03
On the other hand, however, from the time SKOGA went into
operation, and because of the Korean War and the resulting
embargo on trade, the PRC had become progressively dependent
on Russian aviation know-how, aircraft, equipment and related
supplies. Chinese pilots, crew and ground personnel also faithfully
and exclusively emulated the Soviet model. At first when relations
with the Soviet Union were normal and cordial, the Chinese
Communists did not feel the anomaly of their "lean-to-one-side"
policy. But later, as bilateral relations began to rupture, they
slowly came to grip with the vestiges of the "Sovietization"
process. The telling moment finally came in 1960. In the summer
of that year the Russians withdrew all their technical advisers
and assistance from the PRC.10 4 For the future of civil air
transport in China, that event touched off some very serious
problems.

103. Sino·Soviet Airline Gains Rapid Development ... , NCNA, (Peking),
October 22, 1954; Soviet Experts Train Chinese Air Staff, NCNA, (Peking),
December 31, 1954.
104. On the incident and a general treatment of China's growing resentment of
the Soviet Union, see MICHAEL, Sino-Soviet Relations, in CHINA - A HANDBOOK
326-36 (1973).
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First of all, since the pilots and ground staff in SKOGA (and
later CAAC) had been Soviet-trained, and had been taught only to
fly Russian-made aircraft, most of them were unable to operate
U.S., British or French manufactured aircraft until very recently.
For these people, the airline later had to consider the necessity of
"re-education." As a matter of fact, the situation is really not
dissimilar with the need for pilot "re-training" in the case of a
merger of two or more airlines using different types of aircraft and
equipment. A case in point is the merger of Bonanza, Air West
and Sundance Airlines to form Hughes Air West in the United
States. There, the new company suffered an initial loss as the
management failed to plan for such a contingency.1°5 While the
exact amount of time and cost for familiarizing a Chinese pilot
with, for instance, a Boeing 707 is not readily known, a general
idea may be derived from the fact that it normally takes a
minimum of one month and $50,000 to properly teach a Boeing
707 pilot to fly a Boeing 747. It necessarily follows that the time
and cost will be much more in the case of a Chinese pilot who has
to switch from a Russian Ilyushin to an American Boeing.l06
In the second place, it should be emphasized that Soviet aid
during this period was not in any way gratuitous. It is estimated
that by the end of 1957, China was indebted to the Soviet Union in
the amount of JMP $5,294 million for the aid, assistance and
loans the latter had provided. The purchase price for Soviet
interests in SKOGA was apparently included in this. 107 Assuming
that the above loan was being liquidated by the Chinese at a rate
of JMP $500 million per year, it would have taken at least ten
years to pay off the principal alone. Since the Russians had
always insisted on punctual repayments, the financial burden on
the Chinese was obviously immense. In turn, that adversely
affected China's aircraft production and acquisition capabilities.
In reality, of course, by far the brunt was felt by the Chinese
airline and aircraft industry as a whole. By nature, the industry is
a particularly vulnerable one. It depends on viable modem
technology, capable personnel, reliable aircraft fleet, proper
maintenance and adequate fuel and parts supply. Without them,

105. Notes on Airline Industry (Reading materials, Stanford Graduate School of
Business, 1975.)
106. Information courtesy of Pan Am Capt. Charles Banfe.
107. CHIN, COMMUNIST CHINA'S RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION,
1949-1957, at 29 (1961).
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the productivity and utility of the industry will be seriously
limited. That was the greatest difficulty which Chinese aviation
on the Mainland encountered with the sudden Russian pull-out,
for not only did the Soviets leave with their blueprints of aircraft
models and their instructions manual, they took away the
assurance of constant backup in expert advice and parts supply.
What they left behind was a fleet of almost entirely Soviet-made
aircraft with little hope of upgrade and high chances of
obsolescence. 108 Worst of all, without the Russians, the PRC fell
behind in its aeronautical technology. Indeed, the Chinese
themselves concede, and American experts concur, that the PRC
is now at least twenty years behind the contemporary western
world in the aerospace industry _10 9
Two LEas
In retrospect, the many setbacks notwithstanding, at least
one good did come out of the Sino-Soviet split. If anything, it
helped revitalize the ingrained Chinese pride, and spurred on the
People's Republic's desire to be self-sufficient. As a result,
subsequent to the Russian withdrawal "self-reliance" became a
national economic priority in" the PRC. As a concept, however, this
is not really new to China. The Chinese have in fact advocated
"self-reliance" in civil aviation since the Nationalists' days in
Nanking. Indeed, in 1927 when Sun Fo entered into the first air
mail contract with the Americans, many Chinese had protested
vigorously and unsuccessfully, in the firm belief that China could,
and should have gone it alone. 110 But then to the Chinese
government at that time, faced with the problems of unification
and national reconstruction, the advantages of instant foreign
capital, equipment, know-how and entrepreneurship seemingly,
and probably rightfully, outweighed all other concern. Thus,
although "self-reliance" may have been preached, it was certainly
not practiced in the period before 1949.
WALKING ON

108. Supra note 71; for a more detailed treatment, see HEYMANN, China's Air
Transport Industry, in DOING BusiNESS WITH CHINA: AMERICAN TRADE
OPPORTUNITIES IN THE 1970s (1974); China's Technology Acquisitions-Part OneAircraft Acquisitions R1573 (Santa Monica: RAND 1975).
109. Id., HEYMANN.
110. For a selection of petitions against American involvement assembled by
the then Chinese Minister of Communications, see 47 Chiao-t'ung kung-pao 34-40
(Official Reports on Communications), (Ministry of Communications, China, 1929).
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When the Communists came to power in China, they quite
naturally viewed their predecessor's attitude with distaste. In
their opinion, the Nationalists had ruined the country with their
corruption, their collusion with wicked foreigners and their totally
misguided plans and efforts (or rather the lack of them) in
national political, social and economic planning. Like other
sectors of the foreign dominated pre-1949 Chinese economy, civil
aviation was perceived by the new leaders as a painful part of
China's developmental experience.lll Being so, it prompted a
sense of humiliation which Chinese on the Mainland now would
so spontaneously identify as an essential product of colonialism
and Imperialist exploitation. In the light of such unsavory early
encounters with the West, China's new leadership had developed a
yearning for the preservation of self-respect, equality and national
sovereignty in its dealings with foreign nations from the very
start. 112 Hence, later on, when they had to tum to the Soviet
Union for various form of assistance, the PRC leaders did so
uncomfortably. Nevertheless, they were able to reconcile it then in
terms of genuine Soviet concern and equality, as well as mutual
respect. 113 As the Chinese fell out with the Soviets, what was once
considered "brotherly love" unfortunately turned into outright
"Social Imperialism." Obviously, foreign help was justified no
longer. That Sino-Soviet enstrangement and abrupt Soviet
withdrawal of assistance came at a time when the nation was
facing an oncoming depression only further aggravated the
feeling of betrayal on the part of the Chinese. In the final
analysis, therefore, the Soviet experience turned out to be a second
baptism of fire for China. Together with the stigma of foreign
domination in pre-1949 China, it prodded the Chinese on the
Mainland onto adopting a firm and unprecedented commitment
toward "self-reliance." It was then that "walking on two legs"
became an over-riding priority in Chinese history.
PROCUREMENT THROUGH PURCHASE

Meanwhile, in the years that follow, in response to the
Russian departure, the Chinese tried a new strategy in replenish111. Supra notes 15, 24. See also Shih, Lieh Ch 'iang tsai hua ti hang-k'ung
ching-cheng, (Various Powers Vying for Civil Aviation in China), 1 SHEN PAO
301-02 (SHEN PAO WEEKLY).
112. Cf. China's condemnation of unequal treaty, and its later preference for the
Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence.
113. WEI, supra note 98; chung-su yu-hao kuan-hsi hsueh-hsi tzu-liao (Learning
Materials for Sino-Soviet Friendly Relations), (Peking: Lien-ho she, 1950).
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ing their civil air fleet.U 4 To begin with, the People's Republic
resorted to "purchase" rather than the traditional modes of
foreign assistance or investment as a means of technology
procurement and transfer. Initially this was not easy; the
available market was saturated with sales restrictions against the
PRC. In spite of the limited procurement opportunities abroad,
however, Peking managed to import civil aircraft from several
sources. In the early sixties, having deliberated on prospects of
direct purchases from France and the United Kingdom, the PRC
bought from the latter a total of ten Vickers Viscount 843s.
Through Pakistan, the Chinese afterwards acquired four used
British manufactured Trident 1 jets. This was followed by more
orders for the Tridents from the U.K., and the purchase of ten
Boeing 707s from the United States in the early seventies. 115 At
about the same time, the PRC entered into a preliminary
agreement for the purchase of two Anglo-French Concorde SSTs.
Finally, toward the end of 1975, Peking signed a contract worth at
least $190 million with Rolls Royce of U.K. which provided for
sale of a certain number of Spey aircraft engines and the
manufacture of such engines in China under license for a period of
five years. Under this agreement, the engines to be built will be
suitable for civil and military application, and Rolls Royce will
explain all technical data, and assist the Chinese in engineering
planning, factory layout, tooling and personnel training. China
would receive the firsts of the agreed upon minimum of fifty Spey
engines in two years. With ultimate onstream production, the
Chinese should be building their own Speys before the end of the
decade. 116

114. For a most recent compilation of CAAC's airplane acquisition data, see
Szuprowicz, supra note 71, at 38-42.
115. The Boeing contract was signed in September 1972. The Chinese were
reportedly interested in the Boeings 18 months ago through talks and questions in
European embassies. Boeing Company later pursued the sales lead, and was
invited to China in April, 1972. After negotiations and a second visit, the
agreement became finalized. Besides the sale often Boeing 707s, the U.S. company
also promised to provide flight training in Seattle, and later in a Shanghai facility.
The purchase price was widely reported to be close to $150 million.
116. The contract between Rolls Royce and China National Technical Import
Corporation (Tech·import) was signed in December 1975. By the following month,
a Rolls Royce team was already seen in China helping the Chinese with site survey
and engineering layout. Under the agreement, the Chinese were not only allowed
to make future improvements on the Spey engines, but they could also, at their
discretion, use them for civil or military purposes. Sale of these locally built Spey
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Given this complex aircraft and aero-engines shopping list of
the Chinese, certain basic patterns become apparent. We can see
that the PRC had been acquiring such aeronautical technology
and equipment as it deems necessary very selectively- carefully
avoiding purchases from one source alone. But there were other
motivating factors besides prudence. Clearly pragmatism and
diplomacy played an important role in the Chinese approach to
procurement from the West. For example, in order to serve her
political and economic interests in Africa and Europe, China
decided to enlarge CAAC's international fleet. In the process of
doing so, the Chinese deliberately acquired more than one model
of long range aircraft. By purposely selecting the Il-62 jet
transports from the Soviet Union, China kept its options open
with the Russians. 117 But more important, in buying the other
model - the Boeing - from the Americans, China not only
provided a stimulus to Sino-U.S. political and commercial
rapprochement, it also succeeded in promoting a competitive
environment in the world civil aircraft market which has proven
extremely favorable to the Chinese. The latter situation is
especially significant for China. In creating and putting itself in
what may be called a "buyer's market", it has been able to benefit
politically as well as economically by simply manipulating and
playing one competitor against another. 118 To a similar extent,
this has happened to nations negotiating with the PRC for
agreements on air traffic rights. In that case the PRC has been
placed in a strong bargaining position owing to the enthusiasm of
the many foreign airlines in flying to the Chinese Mainland. That

engines to a third country is subject, however, to Rolls Royce's approval. Perhaps
as a gesture of goodwill, the employees and the company of Rolls Royce were
guaranteed the right to British legal counsel in case of violation of Chinese law.
See China Deal to Build Powerful Rolls Jets, NYT, December 15, 1975; 3 U.S.
CHINA Bus. REv. 51-52 (Jan-Feb. 1976); 3 U.S. CHINA Bus. REV. 40 (July-August
1976); AviATION DAILY, December 29, 1976, at 19; 18 FEI·CHING YUEH·PAO 100
(CoMMUNIST BANDITS AFFAIRS MoNTHLY).
117. Sale of two Il-62Es and spare parts in 1971 was reported by Moscow
Broadcast on June 18, 1972. In the same year, the PRC bought another three
Il-62Es, bringing the total to five. This was later confirmed by Heymann, supra
note 108, at 164. All the orders were placed subsequent to the revival of Sino-Soviet
trade after a three year suspension.
118. For example, see British & U.S. Lock Horns Ouer China Jet Deals, South
China Morning Post (Hong Kong) March 30, 1973.
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helps to explain, in part, why Japan gave up its profitable Taiwan
air route at the PRC's request during their negotiations in 1974. 119
MAKING FoREIGN THINGS SERVE CHINA

Now, if we would only pause for a moment and relate the
foregoing to China's "self-reliance" policy. Are they not inconsistent with each other in theory and in practice? If not, how might
one explain current PRC policy in the acquisition of aviation
technology?
The fact is, although maximum utilization of indigenous
human and natural resources have become the key in the People's
Republic's struggle for autarky, practical needs have inevitably
developed for which import of foreign goods and technology was
sometimes required. Not only in civil aviation, but in other
industries, the lack of know-how, or the inability to overcome
technological bottlenecks, have often motivated the Chinese to
procure from abroad. For instance, in order to explore its off-shore
oil potentials, the PRC has purchased oil drilling and engineering
equipment from the U.S. and Japan. All that, however, does not
imply any change in the basic policy of "walking on two legs." It
only means that, instead of walking "blindly" on two legs, the
Chinese have adopted a pragmatic, highly selective and wellplanned strategy of development. Moreover, it proves that in
pursuit of progress, the Chinese leaders have reasoned and
accepted foreign technology as a means to an end in selfsufficiency. To them, the key or the "correct line", then, is to
"make foreign things serve China." 120 Accordingly, the Chinese
aviation industry has been taught to "first use, secondly criticize,
and thirdly transform" foreign technology through self-reliance
"to speed up the pace of socialist construction." 1 2 1
From another perspective, the theoretical inconsistency can
also be explained in terms of Mao's dialectic approach. In other
119. In the long run, however, it was restored. Japan now operates to Taiwan
through Japan Asia Airways, a private company.
120. The Peking Review of January 1, 1977 carried one of Chairman Mao's
speeches in 1956 entitled On the Ten Major Relationships. In it, Mao had stressed
that foreign things "should be learnt well in accordance with out own principles so
that our work can be improved ..." He, however, deplored indiscriminate rejection
or imitation of foreign technology. The importance given to this speech by the present Chinese leadership appears to indicate a more pragmatic approach, and a
general endorsement of the policy of "making foreign things serve China."
121. Jen-min Jih-pao, (People's Daily) (Peking) December 10, 1970; Aviation
Self-reliance, China News Summary, No. 350, December 17, 1970.
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words, self-reliance and import of foreign technology are apparent
but reconcilable differences reinforcing and enhancing each other.
Thus, if correctly handled, they can be productive to China's
nation-building efforts as a whole. 122
Considering the present technological gap in civil air
transport, the condition of CAAC's fleet, the adverse effects and
likelihood of recurring political struggle on the mainland, there is
every reason to expect that the People's Republic will continue to
imbue western aeronautical technology in the times ahead. If it
does, in view of Chinese pride and prejudices, the PRC will
continue to be critical of the notion that "foreign equipment is
almighty," or that "without foreign equipment no aviation
product can be manufactured." Although China will accommodate
and utilize techniques from abroad, based on historical influence,
it will always be skeptical about the "inviolability" of foreign
rules, and "blind faith in foreign theories, data and design." 123 It
is therefore essential that foreigners fully grasp this Chinese
sensitivity before approaching the PRC market.

III. Sino-U.S. Prospects and Perspectives
As the leading civil aircraft supplier in the free world, the
United States will be a procurement attraction, among many, for
the PRC. The possibilities are particularly alluring for the U.S.
considering that the Chinese have openly expressed
dissatisfaction with Russia's Ilyushin Il-62. 124 Also the PRC's
purchase of aircraft and related accessories accounted for $60
million, or 8.5% of the total volume of Sino-American trade in
1973. 125 From the U.S. point of view, since its own airlines are
normally unable to afford any substantial aircraft purchases,
foreign markets have, for many years, been a chief source of
revenue for its aerospace industry and, in turn, its balance of

122. On the basic concept, see MAo, ON THE CoRRECT HANDLING OF
CoNTRADICTIONS AMONG THE PEOPLE, (Peking, Foreign Languages Press, 1957).
123. Supra note 53. See also Romensky, Study & Criticism Scores Those Who
Worship Things Foreign, FBIS, People's Republic of China, August 29, 1974.
124. See Spurr, Travellers Tales, FAR EASTERN EcoNOMIC REVIEW, June 17,
1974, at 23; Ward, A Window on the Chinese Aviation Scene, lNTERAVIA, June
1973, at 608.
125. Sino·U.S. Trade Statistics 1972-1973 Including Agricultural Trade (March
1974) (Special Report No. 7, National Council for U.S.-China Trade).
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payrnent.I 26 In the face of stiff foreign competition, a successful
China market for the U.S. would extend production runs, lower
manufacturing costs, support domestic employment and provide
the necessary financial strength to enable the U.S. aircraft
builders to maintain their technical as well as sales supremacy in
world market. Besides, certain components of the aircraft industry
now feel that they could capitalize on the equipment
standardization logic, market familiarity and the experience of
their previous, and particularly, their most recent dealings with
the Chinese. At the same time, many American airlines have
expressed keen interests in developing the PRC market. 127
Meanwhile, the administration may be contemplating sale of
sophisticated aviation technology to the PRC in order that it may
be strengthened to act as a counterveiling force to the Soviet
Union. Whatever the U.S. motive, the question is simply this: in
time, will the People's Republic look again to the U.S. to satisfy its
growing civil aviation needs? If so, what will be its specific
objectives and acquisition strategy? Assuming that direct
purchases will be made, what is the likelihood of traditional
transfer modes such as licensing and joint venture? Will the
Chinese on the Mainland allow the Americans to continue from
where they left off in 1949? In response to this, a number of very
tentative speculations may be put forward. 128
AIRCRAFT TECHNOLOGY

In the area of aircraft technology, the PRC will be expected to
make direct airplane purchases from the U.S. in the foreseeable
126. Foreign Purchases of U.S. civil aviation products accounted for about 35%
of the industry's sales from 1958-69. Between 1965 and 1969, the aircraft industry
contributed 58.9% of total favorable balance of trade, with civil aircraft making up
34.6%. Civil Aviation Research and Development Policy Study 5-29-5-35
(Washington, DC: DOT & NASA, 1971); The Next Commercial Jet if U.S. Airlines
cannot Afford to Buy It ..., Bus. WEEK, April12, 1976, at 62-67. This may have
been altered recently by United Airlines' $1.6 billion order from Boeing Co. See San
Francisco Chronicle, July 15, 1978.
127. Pan Am, United, Northwest, TWA and Capital International have all
petitioned the CAB for a hearing on the reopening of the China route. Supra note 8.
128. In 1973, China bought 15 Nomad STOL from Australia. Lately, the
Chinese have expressed great interest in the British Harrier. Note, the U.S. has
been actively involved in developing the prototype YC-14 STOL which is an
advanced medium/short takeoff and landing transportation aircraft. It is roughly
the size of a Boeing 727, has twin engines and improved lift capacity. The Chinese
are interested in aircraft of this nature for largely military logistic reasons. Since
the VTOL/STOL do not require the usual lengthy runway, they are easier to
conceal from enemy, and particularly, Soviet reconnaissance.
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future. Should any purchases be made, it is doubtful that they will
be of the size and model of the Boeing sale in 1972. Instead of
concentrating on long-range aircraft, Peking will probably begin
looking at wide-bodied and fuel-economy medium range models
such as the Boeing 767 which are apparently suitable for domestic
Chinese use. At the same time, the PRC may also look for aircraft
used for geological surveys, aerial photography and crop dusting
in the U.S. general aviation market. 129
Since continuous direct aircraft purchases would create
political and economic objections, the People's Republic will be
constrained to consider other technology transfer options such as
licensing agreements in aero-engines or aircraft production in the
hope of accomplishing independent indigenous output in the long
run. Unless extremely drastic changes take place in China,
however, the possibility of direct U.S. participation in aviation
joint ventures will be limited. The reasons for the preclusion of
joint ventures are both economic and political.
To the PRC, the notion of a joint venture involving foreign
and private equity ownership and management participation is
contradictory to Socialist economic theory. Unlike Yugoslavia,
Hungary, Romania and the U.S.S.R., the PRC has not yet adopted
an overall conciliatory approach to foreign investments in its
economy. 130 In fact, on many recent occasions, the Chinese have
spoken very strongly against "running joint enterprise with
foreign countries," "joint management," and in particular,
exploiting "her natural resources on a joint venture basis with
any foreign country . . . ." 131 Along this line, a joint venture
proposition from the U.S. would be construed and condemned as
129. For example, the PRC recently ordered four Gates Lear jets. Three of them
are intended to be used as ambulances, and the last for photomapping. AWST,
August 7, 1978.
130. Cf. McMILLAN, CHANGING PERSPECTIVES ON EAST WEST COMMERCE
(1974); LAMERS, JOINT VENTURES BETWEEN YUGOSLAY AND FOREIGN ENTERPRISES
(1976). The PRC, however, has formed a joint-stock steamship company with
Albania. Whether the recent withdrawal of Chinese aid from Albania has affected
it is unclear.
131. Pu Hsuan, Develop Foreign Trade by Maintaining Independence and
Keeping Initiative in Our Own Hands . ... , Jen-min Jih-pao, October 15, 1974; Fei
Chou, Moscow's Transnational Corporations Go By the Name of Joint Stock
Companies, Peking Review, May 28, 1976, at 23-24. In contrast, McDonnell
Douglas and Boeing have been actively engaged in joint ventures in aircraft
production in Europe and Japan. Free World Partners Plan Jets for the 1980s, Bus.
WEEK, August 30, 1976, at 64-66; Boeing and Soviet Sign Cooperative Pact, A WST,
June 10, 1974, at 26.
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an American attempt to bring China back into the pre-1949 era of
foreign economic domination. At the same time, it must be
stressed that even though the PRC had purchased American
aircraft in the past, it did not mean that the Chinese had faith in
their products or intentions any more than they had on their
British or the Russians competitors. For example, in the sale of
the Boeings, the PRC had insisted that the U.S. furnish them a
100% spare parts and engines stockpile. The 125 page contract
with Boeing included provisions for pilot and ground training,
and for the maintenance of a back-up technical crew in China well
into the early phases of scheduled operations. While the
Americans found the contract negotiations to be lengthy,
technical and often "rigorous and difficult," the Chinese criticized
their counterparts for being too "legalistic and overly protective"
in their proposed draft agreement.1 32
Regardless of what actually transpired during the Boeing
negotiations, the inferences are clear. When political and business
relationship between the two countries had been virtually
nonexistent for over two decades, initial economic or technical
contact and cooperation can only be made in a gradual and not
grand fashion. Impatience would only create unwanted risk
detrimental to mutual goodwill and interests. Under these
circumstances, a simple licensing agreement involving technology
transfer and minimum risk would seem more appropriate than a
joint venture which generally demands a more permanent and
institutionalized relationship entailing capital outlay, more
responsibilities and business hazards. 1 33
While I am not optimistic about direct U.S. participation in
joint ventures in the People's Republic, I am not altogether ruling
out such a possibility. Indeed, two recent Chinese decisions have
been particularly thought-provoking in that respect, the foremost
being the PRC's revived interest in overseas Chinese.
As far back as the 1950s, "Hua Ch'iaos" have contributed
substantially to the Communist Chinese economy through foreign
132. China Buy Signals New Markets, A WST, September 18, 1977, at 24-25.
133. C{. The U.S. and the Soviet Union are now engaged in co-production and
co-marketing activities. One example can be found in Soviet-Bendix Breaks
Ground in Trade with Russia, Bus. WEEK, January 11, 1977. By virtue of this
agreement, Bendix will make spark plugs in Russia, and 75% of production will be
sold in Russia. The remainder will be sold through Bendix's own international
marketing network. Bendix reportedly retains control to a degree rare for
foreigners, although the Soviets will manage the plant themselves.
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exchange earnings and remittances. 134 Some have even returned
to the Chinese Mainland to take part in the socialist construction.
Among them were scientists of various disciplines who either gave
up their foreign citizenship or residence to come home. This, for
example, included eminent scientists like Dr. Ch'ien Hsueh-shen,
the missile and jet propulsion specialist of Massachusetts (as
well as California) Institutes of Technology fame. 135 Then there
were those Wlio brought capital witli-them to invest fnspecfally
established investment corporations. 136 By and large, however,
the enthusiasm of the returnees and the government itself
fluctuated with time, and with domestic as well as international
political vicissitudes. Nevertheless, early this year, the People's
Republic once again began to appeal to overseas Chinese and
especially scientists to come to China. From the U.S. alone, as a
start, some 400 scientists are expected to answer the call.
Reportedly, Peking's leaders are contemplating allowing affluent
overseas Chinese to invest capital and know-how in domestic
export-oriented industries. 137 This brings us to the second point;
that is, in the meantime, the PRC has instructed its overseas
banks to adopt "capitalist methods" such as foreign exchange,
stocks and realty speculation to bring in a better financial
return. 138
Taken together, these two decisions suggest that, in order to
meet the goals set for a second "Leap Forward," the People's
Republic has resolved to be realistic and pragmatic about nonsocialist ways and means. 139 The rationalization is that, like
"making foreign things serve China," national construction can

134. See Wu, DoLLARS DEPENDENTS AND DoGMA (1967).
135. DIRECTORY OF SELECTED SCIENTIFIC INSTITUTIONS IN MAINLAND CHINA
226 (1970).
136. See generally, FITZGERALD, CHINA AND THE OVERSEAS CHINESE: A STUDY
OF PEKING's CHANGE IN POLICY 1949-1970 (1970); See also Terrill, What's Really
Going On Inside China, U.S. NEws & WoRLD REPORT, September 4, 1978 at 30-32.
137. Id.; Liu, China's Export Initiative, FAR EASTERN EcoNOMIC REVIEW,
August 4, 1978, at 47-48; Fitzgerald, Behind Peking's Capitalist Overture to
Overseas Chinese, FAR EASTERN EcoN. REv., reprinted in S.F. Chronicle, July 11,
1978.
138. China to Take a Plunge, S.F. Chronicle, July 7, 1978. Another positive
indication of pragmatism in foreign trade is the decision to accept long-term credit
in 1973. See Donnithome, China's Foreign Trade System Changes Gear, U.S.CHINA Bus. REv. (Jan-Feb. 1974), at p. 16.
139. Now, with Vice-Premier Teng Hsiao-ping's return to power, China's
pragmatic economic policy can be expected to continue.
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still retain its socialist character as the Chinese creatively use or
experiment with capitalist methods. The key justification,
however, is that outside capital and technology is introduced here
through foreigners who are ethnically and emotionally Chinese.
In the case of the overseas Chinese bank, again, it is the Chinese
or overseas Chinese, and not the foreigners, who are making the
investment decisions and the profits. That being the case, joint
ventures are less objectionable as control and initiative do not fall
into the hands of the "non-Chinese." Conceptually speaking,
China will still be "walking on two legs," because even though
one of them is technically a transplant, it is nonetheless
biologically compatible, and thus acceptable to the body as a
whole. Whether or not foreign investment "in disguise" will work
in the long run, only time can tell, but at this very moment, there
are quite a few American-Chinese who are ready and willing to
offer the People's Republic their capital and their western-taught
know-how which makes the option one worth considering.
If both countries should, however, choose licensing as the
medium of technology release, provisions must be made to protect
U.S. technological advantage. Ideally, of course, only such
technology based on "mature" products line and available
production technique should be transferred. In the process, the
U.S. must keep in mind that the detection and prosecution of
patent or know-how rights infringements could be difficult in the
PRC. It will remain a problem until the People's Republic becomes
a member of the International Convention for the Protection of
Industrial Property.I4o
AIRLINE AND TouRISM

Much of the same regarding aeronautical technology may be
said of the airline industry in the Sino-U.S. setting. It is safe to
assume that a joint stock company or venture similar in structure
and function to CNAC or SKOGA will not be feasible on the
Chinese Mainland on account of past PRC experiences, and the
complete control the state now asserts over civil air transport. 1 41
This, however, does not preclude other forms of cooperative

140. See Hsia & Haun, Laws of the People's Republic of China on Industrial
and Intellectual Property, 38 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 274 (Summer-Autumn 1973).
141. Reporting directly to the State Council, the General Administration of
Civil Aviation is the state organ in control. It serves the functions of the CAB,
FAA as in the U.S., and performs special and commercial aviation tasks.
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arrangements. In this connection, the key factor is People's
China's recently demonstrated interest in developing its tourist
industry and in extending its air services abroad. 142
At present the Chinese flag carrier CAAC is regularly serving
a total of fourteen nations in Asia, Africa and Europe. Even so, by
conventional standards, its operational methods have been
described as unsophisticated, and its customer and cabin services
as deplorable. As the People's Republic assumes an even more
active part in international and air commerce, it may eventually
become concerned about the below-par rating and may desire to
improve. 143 After all, even though CAAC is state-owned, there is
no reason why it should not be self-supporting and efficient, or
any less concerned with costs and revenues. If anything, like
Russia's Aeroflot, it ought to enter foreign markets with the same
marketing consciousness as its competitors. In this regard, major
American airlines could become very useful. Under a cooperative
agreement, an American carrier such as Northwest, TWA or Pan
Am could provide CAAC with the necessary assistance in market
and operational research, pricing, efficient scheduling, data
processing of reservations and departure control, management
training and customer servicing in return for its promise to
purchase the carrier's used aircraft or other equipment, or for
traffic rights into the PRC. Agreements of this nature are now
commonplace in the Asia and Pacific region.l44
Elsewhere, the growing number of people visiting the Chinese
Mainland has prompted the China Travel Service (CTS) to
carefully review its own needs and capabilities. Thus, recently
CTS in Hong Kong has seen fit to activate the old CNAC office
there to handle some of CAAC's reservations and ticketing
activities. More importantly, it has expressed the desire to install
modern computer and communications facilities to manage CAAC
and hotel bookings as well as other travel arrangements in the
PRC. 145 Obviously there will be a similar need for CTS offices in
the People's Republic and abroad. This would mean sales

142. See China's Civil Aviation and Tourism, translated in China Daily News,
June 26, 1978.
143. For example, see The Dividends of Rediscovery, TIME, November 20, 1972,
at 34-35. See also Ward, supra note 124.
144. For a brief account, see ICAO BULLETIN, May 1976, at 45-47, 57;
November 1976, at 20-23. Lately this has also become common place in Africa and
the Middle East. ICAO BULLETIN, May 1978, 55-57.
145. Information based on computer sales sources in Hong Kong.
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opportunities for the American computer industry. At the same
time, it could open up a possible avenue of contact and
cooperation between the American and the Chinese tourist
agencies. 146
With its recent decision to promote tourism as an industry, the
PRC has also stepped up its efforts to renovate and to expand its
hotel accommodation facilities in over thirty designated
locations. 147 Lately hotel personnel were even sent to Hong Kong
for practical service and management training. In this light, a
successful American franchise enabling the construction of Duna
Intercontinental Hotel in Budapest in 1967 raises another
interesting possibility in the PRC. It is conceivable that an
agreement of a similar nature could be reached to make way for a
wholly-owned subsidiary of a U.S. airline engaged in the hotel or
catering business (e.g., Pan Am and its Intercontinental chain
subsidiary known as IHC) to assist the Chinese in constructing,
designing and training the staff of a new first class hotel at a
chosen location on the Mainland. The Chinese will be permitted to
use the goodwill and name of the hotel chain. For their part, the
Americans will be paid a franchise fee, or a combination of fee
and other concessions. 148 In this manner, it bears a close
resemblance to the Rolls Royce agreement. The difference is only
that, in the present case, success depends on whether, given the
often fluctuating political climate, the PRC will continue to
promote and expand tourism trade in the ensuing decades.
One other aspect of civil air transport development in China
should also be of interest to the United States. In February 1978,
CAAC held a civil aviation meeting which was attended by over
three hundred Chinese representatives. During the meeting, an
emphasis was made on "learning from Tachai" and "Taching";
and a decision was announced to modernize aviation in the next
146. Pan Am has set up a subsidiary travel agency in Peking to handle its tour
groups in China.
147. Supra note 74.
148. PISAR, COEXISTENCE AND CoMMERCE 353 (1970). Together with Tower
International, another U.S. company, Intercontinental Hotels Corporation (IHC), a
Pan Am subsidiary, entered into an agreement for the construction and operation
of luxury hotels in Hungary, Rumania and Czechoslovakia. Later in 1974, IHC
also signed an agreement with the Soviet government to build three hotels in the
U.S.S.R., respectively located in Moscow (1500 beds), Leningrad (2,000 beds) and
Kiev (800 beds). It was agreed that Skanska Cementgjuteriet, a Swedish company,
would do the construction, and together with the IHC, would also be responsible
for arranging Western finance. AWST, June 10, 1974, at 26.
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five years "to keep pace with the growth in socialist construction,
foreign relation and tourism." 149 Of particular concern to CAAC
was the construction of better and up-to-date airfields and
terminals to cope with the country's growing air traffic activities.
Although formerly only airports in Canton, Shanghai and Peking
were capable of handling international jet flights, efforts are now
being made to construct or upgrade airfields and terminals in key
cities such as Tientsin, Hofei, Harbin, Hangchow and Urumchi.
The new or improved runways average from 3,200 to 3,800 meters,
and are presently being equipped with precision landing systems.150 In this connection, American avionics, and aviation
consulting firms, and even airlines can assist in overall master
and regional airport as well as systems planning. At a future date,
American expertise may even be helpful to the Chinese in
environmental analysis, and in the abatement of noise or air
pollution in the airport vicinity. In the mean time, U.S.
engineering companies will be especially interested in providing
Chinese aerodromes with maintenance and overhaul facilities,
and the necessary on-location personnel training. 151 In all these
situations, a management or service contract with CAAC might
be preferred since it would entail a continuing relationship which
is normally conducive both to mutual understanding and actual
problem-solving. In essence, it is similar to licensing to the extent
that it provides an organizational form without involving U.S.
capital investment and the risks attendant.
One final observation must be made in the U.S.-China
context. Granted that opportunities do exist in the aircraft and
airline industry in the PRC, the role of the U.S. will not be an easy
one. On the one hand, the administration may feel that immediate
extension of diplomatic recognition and the MFN treatment to the
PRC is a step in the right direction. On the other hand, however,
Washington may also wish to maintain present U.S. economic
and trade relations with the ROC. If that be the case, then the
U.S. may have to adopt an "even-handed" policy toward Taiwan
and Peking. Consequently, should the administration decide to
license or sell advanced civil aviation technology to the People's
149. NCNA (Peking), February 23, 1978.
150. China New Service (Peking), September 1, 1977. Obviously this opens up a
market for the U.S. in navigational aids and equipment.
151. In 1974, CAAC entered into a $800,000 overhaul and servicing contract for
its Vickers Viscounts, with Hong Kong Aircraft Engineering Corporation
(HAECO).
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Republic, it may have to make an equivalent concession or sale to
the Republic of China. While this seems logical enough, it will not
be easy to accomplish. For one thing, considerable legislative
action will be necessary, and the whole process could be timeconsuming.152
Even when prospects in the PRC materialize into facts, relationships with the Chinese are likely to be strained initially, and
somewhere down the time line. Many of the problems such as
political instability and serious mutual misunderstanding which
had troubled CNAC and other joint aviation ventures in the past
are likely to recur in one form or another. Ideological differences
which had precipitated the Russo-Chinese split earlier on are even
more likely to surface in the U.S.-PRC context and disrupt
bilateral economic and business relations. Moreover, in contrast to
the Russians in the early fifties, the Americans do not have the
advantages of a "lean-to-one-side policy" at this time. Instead,
they will have to compete constantly with their counterparts from
the United Kingdom, France, Australia, Canada and Japan in
order to stay in the China market. On top of that, depending on
the circumstances, U.S. cooperative arrangements with the PRC,
notably business joint ventures, could well have antitrust
consequences. 153 The problems are thus many and varied. For
better or for worse, therefore, the U.S. must be at least
psychologically prepared lest it relive the frustration of its trade
experience with Russia in the past six years. 154
CONCLUSION

In many ways, the PRC on the mainland today is no
different from that which existed half a century ago. In those

152. Ai3 between U.S. and China, the issue of frozen assets in the respective
countries has not been satisfactorily resolved. The possibilities of seizure of
Chinese goods or purchases in the United States therefore remain open. With
diplomatic recognition, this problem should be eliminated, but existing U.S. laws
pertaining to Export-Import Bank financing, OPIC, MFN treatment and arms
transfer in general must be appropriately amended to permit an "even-handed
policy." This takes time and effort. For a study of some of these problems, see LI,
DE-RECOGNIZING TAIWAN, supra note 13.
153. For a treatment of the subject, see Fugate, FOREIGN COMMERCE AND THE
ANTITRUSTS LAws, (1973). In general, joint ventures which include marketing in
their activities are probably most antitrust vulnerable.
154. For an interesting discussion on the decline of the U.S.-Soviet trade, see
Businessmen's View - U.S.-Russia Trade is in Big Trouble. S.F. Chronicle,
September 13, 1978.
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days, the "Middle Kingdom" was egoistic, politically unstable,
and scientifically backward. It was suspicious of foreigners, of
their intents, and of what they can do to undermine its Confucian
culturism. At the same time, though, it was not blind to the
problems of stagnation, and the significance of modernization.
Fifty years later, China is still in transition. Far from being
settled, it now faces political and economic challenges at home
reminiscent of those of the past. Beleaguered by recurring political
struggles and natural calamities within, the China of today still
finds it a difficult task to feed and care for its masses. Of course,
the PRC continues to industrialize; but like its predecessor, it finds
its own scientific knowledge and technical resources as yet
inadequate to provide for its avowed goals. In a repeated
performance, China has thus imported western know-how, and
also accepted some western ways in business and finance. This
time, however, instead of the preservation of Confucian values, it
is worried about the impact of "things foreign" on its MarxistLeninism ideals. Similarly, now pursuing activism and
pragmatism in foreign relations, the People's Republic is
concerned about the necessity and the resulting problem of
participation and ultimate integration in international norms and
systems.
In terms of uneasiness, the People's Republic is not alone. At
the other end, the West is also trying to cope with the emergence
of the PRC from seclusion, and its present policy favoring foreign
technology import. Indeed, in relation to civil aviation, until a few
years ago western nations like the U.S. have not seriously
considered the prospect of selling aircraft or related technology,
and operating air services to the PRC. Now that it is no longer
wishful thinking, westerners are competing for the China market
with zeal and anticipation. As such, there is currently a search for
a viable strategy. Hopefully, this study has provided with an
answer.
In essence, this study suggests that, in approaching the
People's Republic in the context of reopening of bilateral air
services and the transfer of aviation technology, the U.S. must
avoid resorting to traditional ways and means. As we have seen,
in the case of air transport relations, classical concepts of
recognition and state succession are no longer useful. In respect of
airlines and aircraft manufacturing, equity joint ventures are out
of place. Given that other forms of assistance or cooperative
arrangements may be feasible in this industry, the U.S. also
cannot pursue its traditional unscrupulous policy of offering
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various forms of assistance as a means of gaining entry into, and
controlling the airline or aircraft market of a foreign country. As a
matter of fact, the PRC leadership is very emphatic about that, as
is evident in a recent speech by Shen Tu, presently the Director
General of CAAC. While expressing his appreciation of the
necessity for providing technical assistance for the developing
countries, Shen proceeded to warn western nations:" ... We hold
that all genuine assistance should be rendered in full respect of
the sovereignty and national dignity of the recipient countries,
and should ·aim at helping them develop their civil aviation
independently instead of intensifying their dependence on outside
assistance. We are firmly opposed to the vicious practice of
gaining control under the cover of assistance ... " (emphasis
added) 155 Clearly, the times have changed, and so must the old
ways.
At the time of writing, changes are already underway. On the
American side, for example, McDonnell Douglas has recently
come up with an "offset program" in their dealings with the PRC
in which they agree to make arrangements in the U.S. (including
the necessary credit financing) for American firms to buy Chinese
products in consideration of China's decision to purchase their
aircraft. 156 Conversely, the Chinese are also altering their ways.
Lately, in addition to adopting a more realistic banking and
investment policy, the People's Republic has endorsed a "payback-with-products" arrangement with foreign firms that will pay
for imported equipment and technology, or capital borrowed for
that purpose with other export products or products of the
importing plant. 157 To both countries, therefore, the key words are
155. ICAO Doc. 9119/a21-Min.P/1-12, at 65-66. The speech was made at the
21st session of the ICAO Assembly, marking the PRC's first participation there.
156. Gartner, S.F.'s Red Hot Import, S.F. Chronicle, August 16, 1978.
157. Terrill, supra note 136; Liu, supra note 137. Also the PRC has recently
entered into a $127 million land development contract in Hong Kong with two
British companies. Far Eastern Econ. Rev., September 8, 1978. In essence, it is a
rare PRC joint venture with "foreign" equity participation. The Chinese move,
however, was probably politically motivated as a vote of confidence on the future
of the British colony for the benefit of local residents and foreign interests. More
significantly, the joint undertaking is physically outside of China itself. Thus it
does not have any material bearing on a similar venture on aircraft manufacturing
in tlie PRC. Moreover, unlike the "pay-back-with-products" idea, which involves
merely export goods and oil, the chinese here are not dealing with a· readily
marketable consumer product. Unless the PRC, through joint ventures, is able to
produce superior aircraft types which are similarly marketable, there is reaily no
analogy for the Chinese civil aviation industry.
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accommodation and cooperation. While they will serve as the
guideline in this aspect of U.S.-China rapprochement, their
effectiveness, in the long run, will depend on how long the
Chinese will maintain this economic pragmatism and how far the
U.S. will pursue its even-handed policy toward Taiwan. In the
meantime, at least, the outlook of the China market is resonably
good for the U.S. aerospace industry.
By deliberate design, the second part of this study has
attempted to re-create, and to relate to China's developmental
experiences through a study of the history and problems in the
growth of its civil air transport. The underlying hope is that it will
offer food for thought as well as insights in other areas of
interests in the PRC. For instance, the present subject of civil
aviation could have been substituted for the exploration of oil, or
other natural resources in China. Alternatively, we may have
been concerned with the issue of the People's Republic's participation in international politics, or its general attitude toward
international law and trade, or the new international economic
order. One thing is certain and common to all the foregoing. We
invariably find that in order to understand China's present
attitudes on those subjects, we must look beyond its political and
ideological philosophizing and rhetoric into problems and values
deeply rooted in the past. We also discover that progress in the
way of reconciliation with the PRC and many of its concepts can
only be attained very gradually, and not without the simmering
effect of time.
One can only hope that clashes of interests, objectives and
opinions in the past would produce better mutual insight, respect
and understanding between the PRC and the U.S. (as well as the
world at large) so that conflicts will be minimized now and in the
future. Hopefully, through dealing with and understanding the
People's Republic, the West will gain valuable perspectives which
could help improve its present relationship with other developing
Third World countries.
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